SIX

METAPHYSICAL *MEDITATIONS*;

Wherein it is Proved

That there is a

N. 4. 38

G O D.

And that Mans MIND is really distinct from his BODY.

Written Originally in Latin

By *RENATUS DES-CARTES.*

Hereunto are added the OBJECTIONS made against these Meditations:

By *THOMAS HOBBES*

Of *Malmesbury.*

With the AUTHORS Answers.

All Faithfully Translated into ENGLISH, with a short Account of *Des-Cartes's Life.*

By *WILLIAM MOLYNEUX.*

London, Printed by *B.G* for *Benj. Tooke* at the *Ship* in St. *Paul's* Church-yard, 1680.

Some Books ſold by *John Lawrence*, at the *Angel* in *Cornhill*, near the *Royal Exchange*.

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THE TRANSLATORS PREFACE. TO THE READERS.

HAd honor or applauſe and not the publick advantage of Engliſh Readers been the deſign of this Undertaking, the conſideration of the common Fate of Tranſlations had diſcouraged Me from permitting this ever to have ſeen the light; for meer Verſions do alwayes carry with them this Property, that if not well done they may much diſgrace, but if well, not much commend the doers.

And certainly I might well have expected the ſame chance, had this been the Tranſlation of an Hiſtory, Play or Romance; wherein there is requiſite not onely a bare verſion but a conformation of Idiom and language, manner and cuſtomary expreſſion; But the

nature of this preſent Work will not admit of the like liberty, and therefore, I hope, amongſt Judicious Readers it may be exempt from the common Fate of Tranſlations; for if we look upon it as a Philoſophical or Metaphyſical Tract, or rather as (really it is) a Phyſico-Mathematical Argumentation, we ſhall find that a great ſtrictneſs of Expreſſion is requiſite to be obſerved therein. So that had a Tranſlator taken upon him to uſe his own liberty of Phraſe, he would thereby have endanger'd the ſenſe and force of the Arguments; for Politeneſs of language might as well be expected in a Tranſlation of Euclide *as in this. And all that are acquainted with this famous Authors deſign, do very well know, that it was his intention in theſe Meditations* Mathematically to demonſtrate, *that there is a* God, *and that mans* mind *is* incorporeal. *And it was his opinion, that metaphyſicks may as clearly be demonſtrated as mathematicks, as witneſs his expreſſion in the Dedicatory Epiſtle of this Work to the* Sorbone *Doctors*, Eas (*Rationes ſcilicet*) quibus hic utor certitudine & evidentiâ Geometricas æquare, vel etiam ſuperare exiſtimem; *That he reputed his Arguments uſed in theſe Meditations, to equal if not excell*

Geo-

Geometrical certainty.

And this, I ſuppoſe, is ſufficient to make the Reader, not expect herein any ſmoothneſs of phraſe or quaintneſs of Expreſſion; what is here delivered in Engliſh is immediately taken, as it is naturally in the Original. The words, we hope, may be appoſite enough, and fit to expreſs what is here deſigned, and I think it a derogation from the Authors skill to draw the Picture of his mind in any other Colours, than what his own Copy expreſſes.

Thus far in vindication of the Philoſophical plain ſtile and rough Language of the following Tranſlation. I ſhall add a line or two, firſt relating to the Readers, ſecondly of the Author, and laſtly of the Meditations themſelves, together with the Motives which excited me to this Work.

As to the Readers, 'tis, I ſuppoſe, ſo evident, that candour of mind, and freedome from prejudice is requiſite to all that deſire to advantage themſelves by reading other mens notions, that it need not be here inſiſted on with much earneſtneſs; yet conſidering the Antiquity of this ſubject, and the novelty of the Arguments here produced, it ſeems to be more than ordinarily requiſite for an impartial peruſal of the enſuing Tract. Neither are

the following Meditations to be ſlightly paſſed over, but with diligence and attention to be read; for as in mathematical demonſtration, the careleſs miſſing of any one ſingle Poſition may render the Concluſion obſcure and ſometimes inconſequent, ſo in theſe metaphyſical Demonſtrations, which (as before has been noted from the illuſtrious Author thereof) for certainty do equal, if not excel Geometrical Propoſitions, the ſlight attention to any one particular Argument may fruſtrate the deſign of the whole diſcourſe.

The Reaſoning therefore here being cloſe and ſolid, and (as in Mathematicks) the knowledge of the latter depending on the knowledge of what went before, 'tis the duty of every Reader ſeriouſly to attend the Particulars, as alſo the connexion of the whole. Let him weigh the Arguments and perpend the Concluſions, and after a clear and diſtinct Knrwledge, lett him paſs his judgement.

And to this end I ſhall make it my requeſt to every Reader, that he would not be content with a ſingle peruſal of the following Diſcourſes, but that he would often repeat his reading them over; for by this means the force of thoſe Arguments, which at firſt may by chance eſcape the moſt diligent and attentive

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Peruſer, by a ſecond or third Eſſay may offer themſelves more fully to his Conſideration. This Was the deſire of our Author in an other of his peices, I mean his Principles of Philoſophy, *which I am ſure do not require ſo ſtrict an attention of mind, as theſe abſtracted ſpeculations; and therefore if it were his Requeſt in that caſe, we may Reaſonably think that 'twas no leſs his deſire in this.*

When we come to ſpeak of the Incomparable Author of theſe Meditations, we have reaſon to lament our own Ignorance, and to blame the Ingratitude of the Age wherein he lived, for not tranſmitting to Poſterity more certain and ample Records of the Life and Converſation of this Excellent Philoſopher, all that has been Written in this kind gives us only ſo much light into the Life of this Prodigious Man, as may make us wiſh for more; imparting which, I ſhall recommend the Readers to a further enquiry into the inward Thoughts, (largly diſcover'd in the Writings) of our Famous Author, of whoſe outward actions and condition we have ſo ſmall knowledge.

Renatus Des-Cartes was born on the laſt day of March *in the year* 1596. *at* Tours, *or at* Caſtrum Eraldum *a Town near* Tours *in* France; *He came of an Antient*

and Noble Family, being by Descent Lord of Perron, His Father was a Senator of his Country, and a Man of no mean estate, leaving to this his only Son by a second Wife between six and seven thousand pounds a year.

He was Educated in his younger years according to the manner of his Country (and as he himself recommends in one of his Epistles, viz. Epist. 90. partis secundæ to One for the Instruction of his Son) in the Aristotelian principles of Philosophy, a whole course whereof he had run through at the Age of seventeen in the Schools of Flexia, or La Fleche a Town in the Province of Anjou, famous for the Colledge of Jesuites there establish'd by Henry the 4th.

But to this he did not Continue long devoted, giving early testimonies of his dislike to the unsatisfactory Notions, and verbose emptiness of the Peripatetick Philosophy; He used therefore his utmost endeavours (as he himself testifies in his Dissertatio de Methodo) to get loose from those Chains and Fetters of Mind, to which the weakness of his tender years had subjected him.

To this end he betook himself to a long course of Travel, that by the variety of Objects, which he was likely to meet with in his journeys,

neys, the memory of his paſt Notions might be blotted out; In his travel he applied himſelf much to the ſtudy of the Art Military, and Mathematicks; In the latter he has left the World large teſtimonies of his Excellence in his Book of Geometry; *and in the former we have reaſon to believe him moſt expert, for He was perſonally preſent at ſome Sieges and Battles both in* France *and* Germany, *as particularly at the Siege of* Rochel, *of* Gava *near* Genoa, *of* Breda, *at the Battle of* Prague, &c. *ſo that we may conclude that he had a Genius fitted (according to the Motto of the noble* Sir W. Raliegh) Tam Marti, quam Mercurio, *For the Pike as well as Pen. And as the Glorious Roman Emperour became a* Cæſar *by his Book as well as Sword, by the Conqueſts of his mind as well as thoſe of his arm; ſo our Famous Author was* Ex Utroque Clarus.

In his Travels he ſpent many years, in all which time he was not Idle, but highly improved himſelf by his converſe with the Beaux Eſprits, *which he met with in the ſeveral Regions he viſited; The firſt Place he betook himſelf to, was* Italy, *then he went into* Denmark, Germany, Hungary, &c. *And after a Long but advantagious Peregrination he return'd*

turn'd to Amſterdam, *where he intended to take up his Reſt, had he not been called by the French King upon very Honourable terms to* Paris; *During his Continuance there he ſo order'd his annual Revenue, that he might be ſupplied by the hands of a Friend wherever he was. He ſtaid at* Paris *three years, and then retired Himſelf to a ſolitary village in* Holland *called* Egmond, *where he lived twenty five years, during which time he apply'd himſelf wholly to the Reſtauration of true Philoſophy, wherein he gave the World ſuch mighty teſtimonies of his Excellence, that in a ſhort time he became celebrated in the mouths of all Learned Men. Neither were the Courts of Princes ſilent in his deſerved Praiſes; for after a Retirement of twenty five years he was Invited by* Chriſtina Queen of Sweedland *to her Court; Thither upon the intreaty of this brave and Learned Princeſs he betook himſelf, where he had not continued Long before he was ſtruck with a* Peripneumonia *or Inflammation of the Lungs (contracted, as it is thought by the long Diſcourſes which he uſed to hold bare headed with the Queen, continuing them ſometimes till far in the Night,) of which unhappy diſtemper he Died the ſeventh Day after he ſicken'd.*

Thus

Thus Expired this Wonder of his Own and ſucceeding Ages, deſired and lamented by all men, Æqual'd by none. He was buried in a coſtly Monument conſiſting of four ſides, upon which were inſcribed Epitaphs; beſtow'd upon him by many Renown'd Perſons.

What ſhall we now ſay ſufficient to expreſs our Grief for the untimely Deceaſe of this Worthy Philoſopher? But Eſpecially what ſhall we now do to recover our Loſs? Let us endeavour to Redeem what we have loſt by well Husbanding and careful improvement of what is left; which may be done in Part by a Diligent Peruſal of the Works written by this Excellent Author; This, This only is the way of Reviving him again, and of giving him Immortality in ſpight of his untimely Fate. And ſo let him for ever live celebrated by the Deſerved Praiſes of all ingenious Enquirers after truth, and Learning.

Let us therefore caſt our eye upon the Preſent Work of this extroardinary Philoſopher, and therein let us admire his profound Judgment and vigorous Fancy, for if we ſeriouſly conſider it, we ſhall hardly find a more ſolid cloſe piece of Reaſoning either in this or Foregoing ages; Here, *what was commonly aſſerted without proof, is not only proved*

ed but Mathematically *Demonſtrated*, viz. *That* God is the Fountain and Original of Truth; *His ſharp Wit, like* Hannibals *Vinegar, hath eaten thro the Mazing and overtowring hills of Errors, a Plain and Pleaſant Way to the Divine ſeat of Knowledge.*

In fine, ſuch is the Excellence of theſe ſix Meditations, that I cannot reſemble his Performance herein better than to the Six Days Work of the Supream Architect; and certainly next to the Creation of All things out of Nothing, the Reſtauration of Truth out of Errors is the moſt Divine Work; ſo that (with Reverence be it ſpoken) the Incomparable Des-Cartes *does hereby deſerve as it were the name of a Creatour. In the firſt* Meditation *we are Preſented with a Rude and Indigeſted Choas of Errours and Doubts, till the Divine ſpirit of the Noble* Des-Cartes *(pardon the Boldneſs of the Expreſſion)* moves upon the confuſed face of theſe Waters, *and thereout produces ſome* clear *and* diſtinct Light; *by which* Sun-ſhine *he proceeds to bring forth and cheriſh other* Branches *of* Truth; *Till at laſt by a ſix Days Labour he Eſtabliſhes this Fair Fabrick (as I may call it) of the* Intellectual World *on foundations that ſhall never be ſhaken. Then ſitting down with reſt and ſa-*

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tisfaction he looks upon this his Off-spring, and Pronounces it Good.

These Things Consider'd, I need not make any long Apologies for my undertaking a translation thereof; The excellency of the Original is sufficient to vindicate my endeavours to present the English World with a Copy, and he that shall blame my Intentions of Communicating the Methods of Truth to those that have only the English Tongue, may as well find fault with those English that propagate the Christian Religion among savage Indians, and translate the Scriptures into their Language, because they have not the English Tongue. To understand Latin is no (or at most a very small) part of Learning, and that which certainly every Cobler in Rome *was once endow'd with; and therefore must there then be no translations out of Greek into Latin? I doubt not, but there are many Persons in our Nations, who tho wanting Latin, are notwithstanding very capable of the most abstracted speculations; the late disturbances of our Kingdomes occasion'd many Youths, who were then in a fair way of Instruction, to forsake their learning, and divert their intentions from Literature to Arms, and yet many of these have afterwards become Men of extraordi-*

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nary abilities and qualifications for learning notwithſtanding their deficiency in the Roman *Tongue. And I ſee no Reaſon why it ſhould not be the deſire, and conſequently the endeadeavour of every true Engliſh man, to make his language as univerſal as is now the* French, *into which the beſt Books in all ſorts of Learning, both Poetry and Proſe, are daily tranſlated out of all languages, but eſpecially out of Greek and Latine. Among which theſe* Meditations *are to be found, entituled,* Les Meditations Metaphyſiques De Rene Des Cartes touchant la Premiere Philoſophie, *This was tranſlated out of the Authors Latine into French by* Monſieur le D. D. L. N. S. *The ſeveral Objections alſo, which were made by divers learned Perſons againſt theſe* Meditations, *with the Authors Anſwers, were tranſlated into French by* M. B. L. R. *And, I hope, no one will aſſert, that the French are more fit to receive thoſe metaphyſical Notions delivered herein than the Engliſh Nation.*

But 'twas none of the ſmalleſt motives I had to this undertaking, that tho ſome famous Engliſh Authours have taken notice of the Arguments here produced (for the proof of a Deity *drawn from the* Idea *we have of* God *in our Mind*, &c.) *Particularly the*

moſt

most excellent and learned Dr. Stillingfleet *in the first Chapter of the third Book in his* Origines Sacræ, *who refers his Readers to a further search into these* Meditations *in the* 400 page *of that Discourse; as also the Reverend Dr.* Henry More *in his* Antidote against Atheism, *and more fully in his* Appendix *annex'd thereto, hath treated of our Authors demonstration; and yet nothing of the genuine original from whence they have borrowed all their Copies (tho some of them drawn in a larger size, yet I question whether so expressive) nothing of our Authors proper management hath ever appear'd in English. Those that assert these Arguments to have been long before thought upon by some of the Fathers, I shall refer to our Authors just vindication of himself in his several Answers to Objections made against these Discourses.*

And here I shall dismiss the Reader detaining him no longer from that satisfaction which he may reasonably expect from the perusal of the following Meditations; *this Translation is dedicated to no one in particular, but is humbly submitted to the moderate censure of all candid Readers, by*

Their humble Servant

Dublin Feb. 19. 16$\frac{79}{80}$.

Will. Molyneux.

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THE

THE Metaphyſical Meditations OF *Renatus Des-Cartes*, &c.

MEDITAT. I.

Of Things Doubtful.

SOME years paſt I perceived how many *Falſities* I admitted off as *Truths* in my Younger years, and how *Dubious* thoſe things were which I raiſed from thence; and therefore I thought it requiſite (if I had a deſigne to eſtabliſh any thing that ſhould prove *firme* and *permanent* in ſciences) that once in my life I ſhould clearly caſt aſide all my former opinions, and begin a new from ſome *Firſt principles*. But this ſeemed a great Task, and I ſtill

expected that maturity of years, then which none could be more apt to receive Learning; upon which account I waited ſo long, that at laſt I ſhould deſervedly be blamed had I ſpent that time in *Deliberation* which remain'd only for *Action*.

This day therefore I conveniently releaſed my mind from all cares, I procured to my ſelf a Time Quiet, and free from all Buſineſs, I retired my ſelf Alone; and now at length will I freely and ſeriouſly apply my ſelf to the General overthrow of all my former Opinions.

To the Accompliſhment of Which, it will not be neceſſary for me to prove them all *falſe* (for that perhaps I ſhall never atcheive) But becauſe my reaſon perſwades me, that I muſt withdraw my aſſent no leſs from thoſe opinions which ſeem *not ſo very certain* and *undoubted*, then I ſhould from thoſe that are *Apparently falſe*, it will be ſufficient if I reject all thoſe wherein I find any *Occaſion* of doubt.

Neither to effect this is it neceſſary, that they all ſhould be run over particularly (which would be an endles trouble) but becauſe the *Foundation* being once undermin'd,

undermin'd, whatever is built thereon will of its own accord come to the ground, I ſhall therefore immediately aſſault the very *principle*, on which whatever I have believed was *grounded*. Viz.

Whatever I have hitherto admitted as moſt true, that I received either from, or by my Senſes; but theſe I have often found to deceive me, and 'tis prudence never certainly to truſt thoſe that have (tho but once) deceived us.

1 *Doubt.* But tho ſometimes the *ſenſes* deceive us being exerciſed about *remote* or *ſmall* objects, yet there are many other things of which we cannot doubt tho we know them only by the ſenſes? as that at preſent I am in this place, that I am ſitting by a fire, that I have a Winter gown on me, that I feel this Paper with my hands; But how can it be denied that theſe hands or this body is mine; Unleſs I ſhould compare my ſelf to thoſe mad men, whoſe brains are diſturbed by ſuch a diſorderly melancholick vapour, that makes them continually profeſs themſelves to be Kings, tho they are very poor, or fancy themſelves cloathed in Purple Robes, tho they are naked, or that their

heads are made of Clay as a bottle, or of glaſs, *&c.* But theſe are mad men, and I ſhould be as mad as they in following their example by fancying theſe things as they do.

1 *Solution.* This truly would ſeem very clear to thoſe that never *ſleep*, and ſuffer the ſame things (and ſometimes more unlikely) in their repoſe, then theſe mad men do whilſt they are awake; for how often am I perſwaded in a Dream of theſe uſual occurrences, that I am in this place, that I have a Gown on me, that I am ſitting by a fire, *&c.* Tho all the while I am lying naked between the Sheets.

But now I am certain that I am awake and look upon this Paper, neither is this head which I ſhake aſleep, I knowingly and willingly ſtretch out this hand, and am ſenſible that things ſo diſtinct could not happen to one that ſleeps. As if I could not remember my ſelf to have been deceived formerly in my ſleep by the like thoughts; which while I conſider more attentively *I* am ſo far convinced of the difficulty of diſtinguiſhing ſleep from waking that *I* am amazed, and this very amazement almoſt perſwades me that *I* am aſleep.

2 *Doubt.* Wherefore let us ſuppoſe our ſelves *aſleep*, and that theſe things are not *true*, viz. that we open our eyes, move our heads, ſtretch our hands, and perhaps that we have no ſuch things as hands or a body. Yet we muſt confeſs, that what we ſee in a Dream is (as it were) *a painted Picture*, which cannot be deviſed but after the *likeneſs* of ſome *real* thing; and that therefore theſe Generals at leaſt, *viz.* eyes, head, hands, and the whole body are things *really exiſtent* and not *imaginary*; For Painters themſelves, (even then when they deſign Mermaids and Satyrs in the moſt unuſual ſhapes) do not give them natures altogether new, but only add the divers Parts of different Animals together; And if by chance they invent any thing ſo new that nothing was ever ſeen like it, ſo that 'tis wholy fictitious and falſe, yet the colours at leaſt of which, they make it muſt be *true Colours*; ſo upon the ſame account, tho theſe General things as eyes, head, hands, *&c.* may be imaginary; yet nevertheleſs we muſt of neceſſity confeſs the more *ſimple* and *univerſal* things to be *True*, of which (as of true Colours) theſe *Images* of things (whether

true or *false*) which are in our minds are made; such as are the nature of a body in General, and its Extension, also the shape of things extended, with the quantity or bignels of them, their number also, and place wherein they are, the time in which they continue, and the like, and therefore from hence we make no bad conclusion, that *Physick*, both *Natural*, and *Medicinal*, *Astronomy*, and all other *sciences*, which depend on the consideration of *compound things*, are *Doubtful*. But that *Arithmetick*, *Geometry*, and the like (which treat only of the most *simple*, and *General* things not regarding whether they really are or not) have in them something *certain* and *undoubted*; for whether *I* sleep or wake, *two* and *three* added make five; a *square* has no more sides then *four*, &c. neither seems it possible that such *plain truths* can be *doubted* off.

2 *Solution.* But all this While there is rooted in my mind a certain old opinion of the *being* of an *Omnipotent God*, by whom *I* am *created* in the state *I* am in; and how know *I* but he caused that there should be no Earth, no Heaven, no Body, no Figure, no Magnitude, no Place, and

and yet that all theſe things ſhould ſeem to me to be as now they are? And as *I* very often judge others to Erre about thoſe things which they think they *Throughly underſtand*, ſo why may not *I* be *deceived*, whenever *I* add *two* and *three*, or count the ſides of a *Square*, or whatever other eaſy Matter can be thought of?

3 *Doubt.* But perhaps *God wills not* that *I* ſhould be *deceived*, for he is ſaid to be *Infinitely Good.*

3. *Solution.* Yet if it were *Repugnant* to his *Goodneſs* to create me ſo that *I* ſhould be *always deceived*, it ſeems alſo *unagreable* to his *Goodneſs* to permit me to be deceived *at any time*; Which laſt no one will affirme: Some there are truely who had rather deny *Gods Omnipotence*, then beleive all things *uncertain*; but theſe at preſent we may not contradict. And we will ſuppoſe all this of *God* to be *falſe*; yet whether they will ſuppoſe me to become what *I* am by *Fate*, by *Chance*, by a *continued chain* of *cauſes*, or any other way, becauſe to *erre* is an *Imperfection*, by how much the leſs *power* they will Aſſigne to the *Author* of my *Being*, ſo much the

more Probable it will be, that *I* am ſo *Imperfect* as to be *alwayes deceived.*

To which Arguments *I* know not what to anſwer but am forced to confeſs, that there is nothing of all thoſe things which *I* formerly received as *Truths*, whereof at preſent *I* may not *doubt*; and this doubt ſhall not be grounded on inadvertency or Levity, but upon ſtrong and premeditating reaſons; and therefore *I* muſt hereafter (if *I* deſigne to diſcover any truths) withdraw my aſſent from them no leſs then from *apparent falſhood.*

But 'tis not ſufficient to think only *Tranſiently* on theſe things, but I muſt take care to *remember* them; for dayly my old opinions returne upon me, and muſt againſt my Will almoſt poſſeſſe my Beleife tyed to them, as it were by a continued *uſe* and *Right* of *Familiarity*; neither ſhall I ever ceaſe to *aſſent* and *truſt* in them, whilſt I ſuppoſe them as in themſelves they really are, that is to ſay, *ſomething doubtful* (as now I have proved) yet notwithſtanding *highly Probable*, which it is much more Reaſonable to beleive then disbeleive.

Wherefore

Wherefore I conceive I ſhould not do amiſs, if (with my mind bent clearly to the contrary ſide) I ſhould deceive my ſelf, and ſuppoſe them for a While altogether *falſe* and *Imaginary*; till at length the Weights of prejudice being equal in each ſcale, no ill cuſtome may any more Draw my Judgement from the *true Conception* of things, for I know from hence will follow no dangerous Error, and I can't too immoderately pamper my own Inecredulity, ſeeing What I am about, concernes not *Practice* but *Speculation*.

To Which end I will ſuppoſe, not an *Infinitely perfect God*, the *Fountain* of *truth*, but that ſome *Evil Spirit* which is very *Powerful* and *crafty* has uſed all his endeavours to *deceive* me; *I* will conceive, the Heavens, Air, Eearth, Colours, Figures, Sounds, and all outward things are nothing elſe but the deluſions of Dreams, by which he has laid ſnares to catch my eaſy beleif; I will conſider my ſelf as not having hands, Eyes, Fleſh, Blood, or Sences, but that *I* falſely think that *I* have all theſe; *I* will continue firmly in this Meditation; and tho it lyes not in my power to *diſcover any truth*, yet this

this is in my power, not to *aſſent to Falſities*, and with a ſtrong reſolution take care that the *Mighty deceiver* (tho never ſo *powerful* or *cunning*) impoſe not any thing on my beleife.

But this is a laborious intention, and a certain ſloth reduces me to the uſual courſe of life, and like a Priſoner who in his ſleep perhaps enjoy'd an imaginary liberty, and when he begins to ſuppoſe that he is aſleep is afraid to waken, but is willing to be deceived by the *Pleaſant deluſion*; ſo *I* willingly fall into my old opinions, and am afraid to be Rouſed, leaſt a toilſome waking ſucceeding a pleaſant reſt *I* may hereafter live not in the *light*, but in the confuſed *darkneſs* of the *doubts* now raiſed.

MEDITAT-

MEDITAT. II.

Of the nature of Mans mind, *and that 'tis eaſier proved to* be *then our* body.

BY yeſterdays Meditation *I* am caſt into ſo great *Doubts*, that *I* ſhall never forget them, and yet *I* know not how to anſwer them, but being plunged on a ſuddain into a deep Gulf, *I* am ſo amazed that *I* can neither touch the bottome, nor ſwim at the top.

Nevertheleſs, *I* will endeavour once more, and try the way *I* ſet on yeſterday, by removing from me whatever is in the *leaſt doubtful*, as if I had certainly diſcover'd it to be *altogether falſe*, and will proceed till *I* find out ſome *certainty*, or if nothing elſe, yet at leaſt this *certainty*, *That there is nothing ſure.*

Archimedes required but a *point* which was *firm*, and *immoveable*, that he might move the *whole Earth*, ſo in the preſent undertaking Great things may be expected,

if

if *I* can diſcover but the *leaſt thing* that is *true* and *indiſputable*.

Wherefore *I* ſuppoſe all things *I* ſee are *falſe*, and believe that nothing of thoſe things are really exiſtent, which my deceitful memory repreſents to me; 'tis evident *I* have no ſenſes, that a Body, Figure, Extenſion, Motion, Place, *&c.* are meer Fictions; what thing therefore is there that is *true*? perhaps only *this*, *That there is nothing certain.*

Doubts and Solutions. But how know *I* that there is nothing *diſtinct* from all theſe things (which *I* have now reckon'd) of which *I* have no reaſon to *doubt*? *Is* there no *God* (or whatever other name *I* may call him) who has put theſe thoughts into me? Yet why ſhould *I* think this? When *I* my ſelf perhaps am the *Author* of them. Upon which Account, therefore muſt not *I* be ſomething? 'tis but juſt now that *I* denied that *I* had any *ſenſes*, or any *Body*. Hold a while — Am *I* ſo tied to a *Body* and *ſenſes* that *I* cannot *exiſt* without them? But *I* have perſwaded my ſelf that there is nothing in the World, no Heaven, no Earth, no Souls, no Bodies; and then why not, that *I my ſelf am not*?

Yet

Yet ſurely if *I* could perſwade my ſelf any thing, *I was.*

But there is *I* know not what ſort of *Deceivour* very *powerful* and very *crafty*, who always ſtrives to *deceive* Me; without Doubt therefore *I am*, if he can *deceive me*; And let him *Deceive* me as much as he can, yet he can never make me *not to Be*, whilſt *I think that I am.* Wherefore *I* may lay this down as a *Principle*, *that whenever this ſentence I am, I exiſt, is ſpoken or thought of by Me, 'tis neceſſarily True.*

But *I* do not yet fully underſtand *who I am* that now neceſſarily *exiſt*, and *I* muſt hereafter take care, leaſt *I* fooliſhly *miſtake* ſome other thing *for my ſelf*, and by that means be *deceived* in that thought, which *I* defend as the moſt *certain* and *evident* of all.

Wherefore *I* will again Recollect, what *I* believed *my ſelf to be* heretofore, before *I* had ſet upon theſe Meditations, from which *Notion I* will withdraw whatever may be *Diſproved* by the *Forementiond Reaſons*, that in the End, *That* only may Remain which is *True* and *indiſputable.*

What

What therefore have *I* heretofore thought my ſelf? *A Man.* But what is a *man*? ſhall *I* anſwer, a *Rational Animal*? By no means; becauſe afterwards it may be asked, what an *Animal* is? and what *Rational* is? And ſo from one *queſtion I* may fall into greater *Difficulties*; neither at preſent have I ſo much time as to ſpend it about ſuch Niceties.

But I ſhall rather here Conſider, what heretofore repreſented it ſelf to my thoughts *freely*, and *naturally*, whenever I ſet my ſelf to underſtand *What I my ſelf was.*

And the firſt thing I find Repreſenting it ſelf is, that I have *Face*, *Hands*, *Arms*, and this whole *frame* of *parts* which is ſeen in my *Body*, and which I call my *Body.*

The next thing repreſented to me was, that *I* was *nouriſh'd*, could *walk*, had *ſenſes*, and could *Think*; which functions *I* attributed to my *Soul.* Yet what this *ſoul* of mine was, *I* did not fully conceive; or elſe ſuppoſed it a ſmall thing like *wind*, or *fire*, or *aire*, infuſed through my *ſtronger parts.*

As to my *Body* truly *I* doubted not, but

but that *I* rightly underſtood its *Nature*, which (if *I* ſhould endeavour to deſcribe as *I* conceive it) *I* ſhould thus Explain, *viz.* By a *Body I* mean whatever is *capable* of *Shape*, or can be *contained* in a *place*, and ſo fill's a ſpace that it excludes all other *Bodys* out of the ſame, that which may be *touch'd*, *ſeen*, *heard*, *taſted*, or *ſmelt*, and that which is *capable* of *various Motions* and *Modifications*, not from it *ſelf*, but from any *other thing moving* it, for *I* judged it *againſt* (or rather *above*) the *nature* of a *Body* to *move it ſelf*, or *perceive*, or *think*, But rather admired that *I* ſhould find theſe *Operations* in certain *Bodys*.

Doubts and Solutions. But How now (ſince *I* ſuppoſe a certain *powerful* and (if it be lawful to call him ſo) *evil deluder*, who uſeth all his endeavours to deceive me in all things) can *I* affirme that I have any of thoſe things, which I have now ſaid belong to the *nature* of a *Body*? Hold— Let me Conſider—, Let me think—, Let me reflect— I can find no Anſwer, and I am weary with repeating the ſame things over-again in vain.

But Which of theſe *Faculties* did I attribute to my *Soul*, my *Nutritive*, or *Motive faculty*? yet now ſeeing I have no *Body*, theſe alſo are *meer deluſions*. Was it my *ſenſitive faculty*? But this alſo cannot be perform'd without a *Body*, and I have ſeem'd to *perceive* many things in my *ſleep*, of which I afterwards underſtood my ſelf *not* to be *ſenſible*. Was it my *Cogitative Faculty*? Here I have diſcovered it, 'tis my *Thought*, this alone cannot be ſeparated from Me, I *am*, I *exiſt*, ---*tis true*, but for what time *Am I*? Why I *am* as long as *I think*; For it May be that When I ceaſe from *thinking*, I may ceaſe from being. Now I admit of nothing but what is neceſſarily true: In ſhort therefore I *am* only a *thinking thing*, that is to ſay, a *mind*, or a *ſoul*, or *underſtanding*, or *Reaſon*, words which formerly I underſtood not; I am a *Real thing*, and *Really Exiſtent*, But what ſort of thing? I have juſt now ſaid it, *A thinking thing*.

* Places noted with their Aſterisk are refer'd to in the following Objections.

But am I nothing beſides? I will conſider ---- I am not that *ſtructure* of *parts*, which is called a Mans *Body*, neither am I any

any ſort of *thin Air* infuſed into thoſe Parts, nor a *Wind*, nor *Fire*, nor *Vapour*, nor *Breath*, nor whatever I my ſelf can feign, for all theſe things I have ſuppoſed *not to Be*. Yet my Poſition ſtands firm, *Nevertheleſs I am ſomething*. Yet perhaps it ſo falls out that theſe very things which I ſuppoſe not to exiſt (becauſe to me *unknown*) are in reallity nothing *different* from that very *Self*, which I *know*. I cannot tell, I diſpute it not now, I can only give my opinion of thoſe things whereof I have ſome knowledge. I am ſure that I exiſt, I ask who I am whom I thus know, certainly, the knowledge, of *Me* (preciſely taken) depends not on thoſe things, whoſe exiſtence I am yet ignorant off; and therefore not on any other things that I can *feign* by my *imagination*.

And this very Word (*feign*) puts me in mind of my *error*, for I ſhould *feign* in deed, if I ſhould *imagine* my ſelf any thing; for to *imagine* is nothing elſe but to think upon the *ſhape* or *image* of a *corporeal* thing; but now I certainly know that *I am*, and I know alſo that 'tis poſſible that all theſe *images*, and generally

whatever belongs to the *Nature* of a *Body* are nothing but *deluding Dreams*. Which things Conſider'd I ſhould be no leſs Fooliſh in ſaying, *I will imagine that I may more throughly underſtand what I am*, then if I ſhould ſay, *at Preſent I am awake and perceive ſomething true, but becauſe it appears not evidently enough, I ſhall endeavour to ſleep, that in a Dream I may perceive it more evidently and truely.*

Wherefore I know that nothing that I can comprehend by my *imagination*, can belong to the *Notion* I have of *my ſelf*, and that I muſt carefully withdraw my mind from thoſe things it that may more *diſtinctly* perceive its *own Nature*.

Let me ask therefore *What I am, A Thinking Thing*, but What is That? That is a thing, *doubting, underſtanding, affirming, denying, willing, nilling, imagining* alſo, and *ſenſitive*. Theſe truely are not a few *Properties*, if they all belong to Me. And Why ſhould they Not belong to me? For am not I the very ſame who at preſent *doubt* almoſt of All things; yet *underſtand* ſomething, which thing onely I *affirm* to be true, I *deny* all other things, I am *willing* to know more, *I would not* be deceived, I *ima-*

imagine many things *unwillingly*, and *conſider* many things as coming to me by my *ſenſes*. Which of all theſe faculties is it, which is not as *true* as that I *Exiſt*, tho *I* ſhould *ſleep*, or my *Creatour* ſhould as much as in him lay, ſtrive to *deceive* Me? which of them is it that is *diſtinct* from my *thought*? which of them is it that can be *ſeperated* from *me*? For that I am the ſame that *doubt*, *underſtand*, and *will* is ſo *evident*, that I know not how to explain it more *manifeſtly*, and that I alſo am the ſame that *imagine*, for tho perhaps (as I have ſuppoſed) no thing that can be *imagined* is *true*, yet the *imaginative Power* it ſelf is *really* exiſtent, and makes up a part of my *Thought*; and laſt of all that I am the ſame that am *ſenſitive*, or *perceive corporeal* things as by my *ſenſes*, yet that I now *ſee* light, *hear* a noiſe, *feel* heat, theſe things are falſe, for I ſuppoſe my ſelf *aſleep*, but I *know* that I *ſee*, *hear*, and am *heated*, that cannot be *falſe*; and this it is that in me is *properly* called *Senſe*, and this ſtrictly taken is the ſame with *thought*.

By theſe Conſiderations I begin a little better to *underſtand My ſelf* what I am; But yet it *ſeems*, and I cannot but *think* that

Corporeal Things (whoſe *Images* are formed in my *thought*, and which by my *ſenſes*, I perceive) are much more *diſtinctly known*, then that *confuſed Notion* of *My Self* which *imagination* cannot afford me. And yet 'tis ſtrange that things *doubtful*, *unknown*, *diſtinct from Me*, ſhould be *apprehended* more *clearly* by *Me*, then a Thing that is *True*, then a thing that is *known*, or then *I my ſelf*; But the Reaſon is, that my Mind loves to wander, and ſuffer not it ſelf to be bounded within the ſtrict limits of *Truth*.

Let it therefore Wander, and once more let me give it the Free Reins, that hereafter being conveniently curbed, it may ſuffer it ſelf to be more eaſily Govern'd.

Let me conſider thoſe things, which of all Things I formerly conceived moſt *evident*, that is to ſay, *Bodies* which we touch, which we ſee, not bodies in General (for thoſe *General* Conceptions are uſually *Confuſed*) but ſome one *Body* in particular.

Let us chuſe for example this piece of *Bees-wax*, it was lately taken from the *Comb*, it has not yet loſt all the *taſt* of the

the *Honey*, it retains ſomething of the *ſmell* of the *Flowers* from whence 'twas gather'd, its *colour*, *ſhape*, and *bigneſs* are manifeſt, 'tis *hard*, 'tis *cold*, 'tis *eaſily felt*, and if you will knock it with your finger,' twill *make a noiſe*: In fine, it hath all things requiſite to the moſt perfect notion of a *Body*.

But behold whilſt I am ſpeaking, 'tis put to the Fire, its *taſt* is purged away, the *ſmell* is vaniſh'd, the *colour* is changed, the *ſhape* is alter'd, its *bulk* is increaſed, its become *ſoft*, 'tis *hot*, it can ſcarce be *felt*, and now (though you ſtrike it) it makes no *noiſe*. Does it yet continue the ſame Wax? ſurely it does, this all confeſs, no one denies it, no one doubts it. What therefore was there in it that was ſo evidently known? ſurely none of thoſe things which I *perceived* by my *ſenſes*; for what I *ſmelt*, *taſted*, have *ſeen*, *felt*, or *heard*, are all *vaniſh'd*, and yet the *Wax remains*. Perhaps 'twas this only that I now think on, *viz.* that the *Wax* it ſelf was not that *taſt of Honey*, that *ſmell of Flowers*, that *whiteneſs*, that *ſhape*, or that *ſound*, but it was a *Body* which awhile before appear'd to me *ſo*

and *ſo modified*, but now *otherwiſe*. But what is it ſtrictly that I thus imagine? let me conſider: And having rejected whatever belongs not to the Wax, let me ſee what will remain, *viz.* this only, a *thing extended*, *flexible*, and *mutable*. But what is this *flexible*, and *mutable?* is it that I *imagine* that this Wax from being *round* may be made *ſquare*, or from being *ſquare* can be made *triangular?* No, this is not it; for I conceive it capable of *innumerable* ſuch *changes*, and yet I cannot by my *imagination* run over theſe *Innumerables*; Wherefore this notion of its *mutability* proceeds not from my *imagination*. What then is *extended?* is not its *Extenſion* alſo *unknown?* For when it *melts* 'tis *greater*, when it *boils* 'tis *greater*, and yet *greater* when the heat is increas'd; and I ſhould not rightly judge of the Wax, did I not think it capable of more various *Extenſions* than I can *imagine*. It remains therefore for me only to confeſs, that I cannot *imagine* what this Wax is, but that I *perceive* with my *Mind* what it is. I ſpeak of this *particular* Wax, for of Wax in *general* the *notion* is more *clear*.

But what Wax is this that I only conceive

ceive by my mind? 'Tis the ſame which I ſee, which I touch, which I imagine, and in fine, the ſame which at firſt I judged it to be. But this is to be noted, that the *perception* thereof is not the *ſight*, the *touch*, or the *imagination* thereof; neither was it ever ſo, though at firſt it ſeem'd ſo. But the *perception* thereof is the *inſpection* or *beholding* of the Mind only, which may be either *imperfect* and *confuſed*, as formerly it was; or *clear* and *diſtinct*, as now it is; the *more* or the *leſs* I conſider the Compoſition of the Wax.

In the interim, I cannot but admire how prone my mind is to erre; for though I revolve theſe things with my ſelf *ſilently*, and *without ſpeaking*, yet am I intangled in *meer words*, and am almoſt deceived by the uſual way of *expreſſion*; for we commonly ſay, *that we ſee the Wax it ſelf if it be preſent*, and not, *that we judge it preſent by its colour or ſhape*; from whence I ſhould immediately thus conclude, therefore the Wax is known by the *ſight* of the *eye*, and not by the *inſpection* of the *mind* only. Thus I ſhould have concluded, had not I by chance look'd out of my window, and ſeen men

Paſſing by in the Street; which men I as uſually ſay that I *ſee*, as I do now, that I *ſee* this Wax; and yet I ſee nothing but their Hair and Garments, which perhaps may cover only *artificial Machines* and *movements*, but I judge them to be men; ſo that what I thought I only *ſaw* with my eyes, I comprehend by my *Judicative Faculty*, which is *my Soul*. But it becomes not one, who deſires to be wiſer than the Vulgar, to draw matter of *doubt* from thoſe ways of *expreſſion*, which the Vulgar have invented.

Wherefore let us proceed and conſider, whether I perceived more *perfectly* and *evidently* what the Wax was, when I firſt look'd on't, and believed that I knew it by my outward *ſenſes*, or at leaſt by my *common ſenſe* (as they call it) that is to ſay, *by my imagination*; or whether at preſent I *better underſtand* it, after I have more diligently enquired both *what it is*, and how it may be *known*. Surely it would be a fooliſh thing to make it matter of doubt to know which of theſe parts are true; What was there in my firſt *perception* that was *diſtinct?* What was there that ſeem'd not incident to e-

very

very other Animal? But now when I diſtinguiſh the Wax from its outward adherents, and conſider it as if it were naked, with it's coverings pull'd off, then I cannot but really perceive it with my mind, though yet perhaps my judgment may erre.

But what ſhall I now ſay as to my *mind*, or my *ſelf*? (for as yet I admit nothing as belonging to me but a *mind*.) Why (ſhall I ſay?) ſhould not I, who ſeem to perceive this Wax ſo *diſtinctly*, know my *ſelf* not only more *truly* and more *certainly*, but more *diſtinctly* and *evidently*? For if I judge that *this Wax exiſts*, becauſe I *ſee* this Wax; ſurely it will be much more *evident*, that *I my ſelf exiſt*, becauſe *I ſee this Wax*; for it may be that this that I ſee is not really Wax, alſo it may be that I have no eyes wherewith to ſee any thing; but it cannot be, when I *ſee*, or (which is the ſame thing) when *I think that I ſee*, that I who *think* ſhould not *exiſt*. The ſame thing will follow if I *judge that this Wax exiſts*, becauſe I *touch*, or *imagine* it, &c. And what has been ſaid of Wax, may be apply'd to all other outward things.

More-

Moreover, if the *notion* of Wax ſeems more *diſtinct* after it is made known to me, not only by my *ſight* or *touch*, but by more and other cauſes; How much the more *diſtinctly* muſt I confeſs my *ſelf known* unto my *ſelf*, ſeeing that all ſort of reaſoning which furthers me in the *perception* of *Wax*, or any other *Body*, does alſo encreaſe the proofs of the *nature* of my *Mind*. But there are ſo many more things in the very *Mind* it ſelf, by which the *notion* of it may be made more *diſtinct*, that thoſe things which drawn from *Body* conduce to its knowledge are ſcarce to be *mention'd*.

And now behold of my own accord am I come to the place I would be in; for ſeeing I have now diſcover'd that *Bodies themſelves* are not *properly perceived* by our *ſenſes* or *imagination*, but only by our *underſtanding*, and are not therefore *perceived*, becauſe they are *felt* or *ſeen*, but becauſe they are *underſtood*; it plainly appears to me, that nothing can poſſibly be *perceived* by *me eaſier*, or more *evidently*, than my *Mind*.

But becauſe I cannot ſo ſoon ſhake off the Acquaintance of my former Opinion,

on, I am willing to ſtop here, that this my new knowledge may be better fixt in my memory the longer I meditate thereon.

MEDITAT. III.

Of GOD, and that there is a God.

NOw will I ſhut my eyes, I will ſtop my ears, and withdraw all my ſenſes, I will blot out the Images of *corporeal* things clearly from my mind, or (becauſe that can ſcarce be accompliſh'd) I will give no heed to them, as being *vain* and *falſe*, and by diſcourſing with my ſelf, and prying more rightly into my own Nature, will endeavour to make my ſelf by degrees more known and familiar to my ſelf.

I am a *Thinking Thing*, that is to ſay, *doubting*, *affirming*, *denying*, *underſtanding* few things, *ignorant* of many things, *willing*, *nilling*, *imagining* alſo, and *ſenſitive*. For (as before I have noted) though perhaps whatever I *imagine*, or am ſenſible of, as without me, *Is not*; yet that *manner*

ner of *thinking* which I call *ſenſe* and *imagination* (as they are only certain *Modes* of *Thinking*) I am certain are in Me. So that in theſe few Words I have mention'd whatever I *know*, or at leaſt Whatever as yet I *perceive* my ſelf to *know*.

Now will I look about me more carefully to ſee Whether there Be not ſome other Thing in Me, of Which I have not yet taken Notice. I am ſure That I am a *Thinking Thing*, and therefore Do not I know what is Required to make me *certain* of any Thing? I Anſwer, that in this My *firſt knowledge* 'tis Nothing but a *clear*, and *diſtinct perception* of What I affirm, Which would not be ſufficient to make me *certain* of the *Truth* of a Thing, if it were *Poſſible* that any thing that I ſo *clearly* and *diſtinctly* Perceive ſhould be *falſe*. Wherefore I may lay this Down as a *Principle*. *Whatever I Clearly and Diſtinctly perceive is certainly True.*

But I have formerly Admitted of many Things as very *Certain* and *manifeſt*. Which I afterwards found to be *doubtful* Therefore What ſort of Things were they? *Viz.* Heaven, Earth, Stars, and all other things which I perceived by my

Senſes.

Senſes. But What did I Perceive of Theſe *Clearly*? *Viz.* That I had the *Ideas* or *Thoughts* of theſe things in my mind, and at Preſent I cannot deny that I have theſe *Ideas* in Mee. But there was ſome other thing Which I affirm'd, and Which (by Reaſon of the common Way of Belief) I thought that I *Clearly* Perceived; Which nevertheleſs, I did not really Perceive; And that was, that there were Certain Things *Without Me* from whence theſe *Ideas Proceeded*, and to which they were exactly like. And this it was, Wherein I was either *Deceived*, or if by Chance I Judged *truly*, yet it Proceeded not from the ſtrength of my *Perception.*

But When I was exerciſed about any ſingle and eaſie Propoſition in Arithmetick or Geometry, as that two and three added make five, Did not I Perceive them *Clearly* enough to make me affirm them True? Truly concerning theſe I had no other Reaſon afterwards to *Doubt*, but That I thought Perhaps there may be a *God* who might have ſo created me, that I ſhould be *Deceived* even in thoſe things which ſeem'd moſt *Clear* to me. And as often as this Pre-conceived opinion of

Gods

Gods great Power comes into my Mind, I cannot but Confeſs that he may eaſily cauſe me to *Err* even in thoſe things which I Think I perceive moſt *Evidently* with my Mind; yet as often as I Conſider the Things themſelves, which I Judge my ſelf to perceive ſo *Clearly*, I am ſo fully Perſwaded by them, that I eaſily Break out into theſe Expreſſions, Let Who can Deceive Me, yet he ſhall never Cauſe me *Not to Be* whilſt I *think that I Am*, or that it ſhall ever be True, *that I never was*, Whilſt at Preſent 'tis True *that I am*, or Perhaps, that Two and Three added make More or Leſs then Five; for in Theſe things I Percieve a Manifeſt Repugnancy; And truely ſeeing I have no reaſon to Think any *God* a *Deceiver*, Nor as yet fully know Whether there Be *any God*, or *Not*, 'Tis but a ſlight and (as I may ſay) Metaphyſical Reaſon of Doubt, which depends only on that opinion of which I am not yet Perſwaded.

Wherefore That this Hindrance may be taken away, When I have time I ought to Enquire, Whether there *Be a God*, And if there be One, Whether he can be a *Deceiver*, For whilſt I am *Ignorant* of this, I can-

cannot poſſibly be fully *Certain* of any Other thing.

But now Method ſeems to Require Me to Rank all My Thoughts under certain Heads, and to ſearch in Which of them *Truth* or *Falſhood* properly Conſiſts. Some of them are (as it were) the *Images* of Things, and to theſe alone the Name of an *Idea* properly belongs, as When I think upon a Man, A Chimera or Monſter, Heaven, an Angel, or *God*. But there are others of them, that have *ſuperadded Forms* to them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny. I know I have alwayes (when ever I think) ſome certain Thing as the *ſubject* or *object* of my Thought, but in this laſt ſort of thoughts there is ſomething *more* which I Think upon then Barely the likeneſs of the Thing. And of theſe Thoughts ſome are called *Wills* and *Affections*, and Others of them *Judgments*.

Now as touching *Ideas*, if they be Conſider'd alone as they are in themſelves, without *Reſpect* to any other Things, they cannot Properly be *falſe*; for Whether I *Imagine* a Goat or a Chimera, 'tis as *Certain* that I *Imagine* one as t'other. Alſo in the

the *Will* and *Affections* I need not Fear any *Falſhood*, For tho I ſhould *Wiſh* for *evil Things*, or Things that are Not, it is not therefore *Not true* that I Wiſh for them.

Wherefore there onely Remains my *Judgments* of Things, in which I muſt take Care that I be not *deceived*. Now the Chief and moſt uſual *Error* that I diſcover in them is, That I *Judge* Thoſe *Ideas* that are *within* me to be *Conformable* and like to certain things that are *without* Me; for truely if I Conſider thoſe Ideas as certain *Modes* of my *Thought*, without Reſpect to any other Thing, they will ſcarce afford me an Occaſion of *Erring*.

Of theſe *Ideas* ſome are *Innate*, ſome *Adventitious*, and ſome Others ſeem to Me as Created by my ſelf; For that I underſtand what *A Thing* Is, What is *Truth*, What a *Thought*, ſeems to Proceed meerly from my own *Nature*. But that I now *hear* a Noiſe, *ſee* the Sun, or *feel* heat, *I* have alwayes *Judged* to Proceed from Things *External*. But Laſtly, Mermaids, Griffins, and ſuch like Monſters, are *made meerly* by *My ſelf*. And yet *I* may well think all of them either *Adventitious*,

or

or all of them *Innate*, or all of them *made by my ſelf*, for I have not as yet diſcover'd their true *Original*.

But *I* ought cheifly to ſearch after thoſe of them which *I* count *Adventitious*, and which I conſider as coming from *outward objects*, that I may know what reaſon I have to think them *like* the things themſelves, which they *repreſent*. Viz. *Nature ſo teaches Me*; and alſo I know that I they *depend* not on my *Will*, and therefore *not on me*; for they are often preſent with me againſt my inclinations, or (as they ſay) in ſpite of my teeth, as now whether *I will* or *no* I feel heat, and therefore I think that the *ſenſe* or *Idea* of heat is propagated to me by a *thing* really *diſtinct* from *my ſelf*, and that is by the *heat* of the *Fire* at which I ſit; And nothing is more obvious then for me to judge that That thing ſhould tranſmit its own *Likeneſs* into me, rather then that any other thing ſhould be tranſmitted by it. Which ſort of arguments whether firme enough or not I ſhall now Trie.

When I here ſay, that *nature ſo teaches me*, I underſtand only, that I am as it were *willingly forced* to beleive it, and

not that tis *diſcover'd* to me to be *true* by any *natural light*; for theſe two differ very much. For whatever is diſcover'd to me by the *Light* of *nature* (as that it neceſſarily Follows *that I am*, becauſe *I think*) cannot poſſibly be *doubted*; Becauſe I am endowed with no other *Faculty*, in which I may put ſo great confidence, as I can in the *Light* of *nature*; or *which* can poſſibly tell me, that thoſe things are *falſe*, which *natural light* teaches me to be *true*; and as to my *natural Inclinations*, I have heretofore often judged my ſelf led by them to the election of the *worſt part*, when I was in the chooſing *one* of two Goods; and therefore I ſee no reaſon why I ſhould ever *truſt* them in any other thing.

And then, tho theſe *Ideas depend not* on my *will*, it does not therefore follow that they *neceſſarily proceed* from *things external*. For as, Altho thoſe *Inclinations* (which I but now mention'd) are in me, yet they ſeem *diſtinct* and *different* from my *will*; ſo perhaps there may be in me ſome other *faculty* (to me *unknown*) which may prove the *Efficient cauſe* of theſe *Ideas*, as hitherto I have obſerved them

them to be formed in me whilſt I *dream*, without the help of any *External Object*.

And laſt of all, tho they ſhould *proceed* from things which are *different* from me, it does not therefore follow that they muſt be *like* thoſe things. For often times I have found the *thing* and the *Idea differing* much. As for example, I find in my ſelf two divers *Ideas* of the Sun, *one* as *received* by my *ſenſes* (and which cheifly I reckon among thoſe I call adventitious) by which it appears to me very *ſmal*; * *another* as taken from the arguments of Aſtronomers (that is to ſay, *conſequentially collected*, or ſome other ways made by me from certain *natural notions*) by which 'tis rendred ſomething bigger then the Globe of the Earth. Certainly both of theſe cannot be *like* that ſun which is *without me*, and my reaſon perſwades me, that that *Idea* is moſt *unlike* the Sun, which ſeems to *proceed Immediately* from it ſelf.

All which things ſufficiently prove, that I have hitherto (not from a *true judgement*, but from a *blind impulſe*) beleived that there are certain things *different* from my

ſelf, and which have ſent their *Ideas* or *Images* into me by the Organs of my *ſenſes*, or ſome other way.

But I have yet an other Way of inquiring, whether any of thoſe Things (whoſe *Ideas* I have *within* Me) are Really Exiſtent *without* Me; And that is Thus: As thoſe *Ideas* are only *Modes* of *Thinking*, I acknowledge no *Inequality* between them, and they all proceed from me in the *ſame Manner*. But as *one* Repreſents *one thing*, an *other*, an *other Thing*, 'tis Evident there is a *Great difference* between them. * For without doubt, Thoſe of them which Repreſent *Subſtances* are ſomething *More*, or (as I may ſay) have *More* of *Objective Reallity* in them, then thoſe that Repreſent only *Modes* or *Accidents*; and again, *That* by Which I underſtand a *Mighty God*, *Eternal*, *Infinite*, *Omniſcient*, *Omnipotent Creatour* of all things beſides himſelf, has certainly in it *more Objective Reallity*, then Thoſe *Ideas* by which *Finite Subſtances* are Exhibited.

But Now, it is evident by the *Light* of *Nature* that there muſt be *as much* at leaſt in the *Total efficient Cauſe*, as there is in the *Effect* of *that Cauſe*; For from Whence can

can the *effect* have its *Reallity*, but from the *Cauſe*? and how can the *Cauſe* give it that *Reallity*, unleſs *it ſelf have* it?

And from hence it follows, that neither a *Thing* can be made out of *Nothing*, Neither a Thing which is *more Perfect* (that is, Which has in it ſelf *more Reallity*) *proceed* from That Which is *Leſs Perfect*.

And this is *Clearly* True, not only in thoſe *Effects* whoſe *Actual* or *Formal Reallity* is Conſider'd, But in Thoſe *Ideas* alſo, Whoſe *Objective Reallity* is only Reſpected; That is to ſay, for Example of Illuſtration, it is not only impoſſible that a ſtone, Which *was not*, ſhould now begin *to Be*, unleſs it were produced by *ſomething*, in Which, Whatever goes to the Making a Stone, is either *Formally* or *Virtually*; neither can *heat* be Produced in any Thing, which before was *not hot*, but by a Thing which is at leaſt of as equal a *degree* of *Perfection* as *heat* is; But alſo 'tis Impoſſible that I ſhould have an *Idea* of Heat, or of a *Stone*, unleſs it were put into me by ſome *Cauſe*, in which there is at Leaſt as much *Reallity*, as I Conceive there is in Heat or a Stone. For tho that *Cauſe* tranſ-

fers none of its own *Actual* or *Formal Reality* into my *Idea*, I muſt not from thence conclude that 'tis *leſs real*; but I may think that the *nature* of the *Idea* it ſelf is ſuch, that of it ſelf it requires no other *formal reality*, but what it has from my *thought*, of which 'tis a *mode*. But that this *Idea* has *this* or *that objective reallity*, rather then any *other*, proceeds clearly from ſome *cauſe*, in which there ought to be at leaſt as much *formal reallity*, as there is of *objective reallity* in the *Idea* it ſelf. For if we ſuppoſe any thing in the *Idea*, which was not in its *cauſe*, it muſt of neceſſity have this from *nothing*; but (tho it be a moſt *Imperfect manner* of *exiſting*, by which the thing is *objectively* in the *Intellect* by an *Idea*, yet) it is not *altogether nothing*, and therefore cannot proceed from *nothing*.

Neither ought I to doubt, ſeeing the *reallity* which I perceive in my *Ideas* is only an *objective reallity*, that therefore it muſt of neceſſity follow, that the ſame *reallity* ſhould be in the *cauſes* of theſe *Ideas formally*. But I may conclude, that 'tis ſufficient that this *reallity* be in the very *cauſes* only *objectively*. For as that *objective*

jective manner of *being* appertains to the very *nature* of an *Idea*, ſo that *formal manner* of *being* appertains to the very *nature* of a *cauſe* of *Ideas*, at leaſt to the *firſt* and *chiefeſt cauſes* of them; For tho perhaps one *Idea* may receive its birth from an other, yet we cannot proceed in *Infinitum*, but at laſt we muſt arrive at ſome *firſt Idea*, whoſe *cauſe* is (as it were) an *Original copy*, in which all the *objective reallity* of the *Idea* is *formally contain'd*. So that I plainly diſcover by the *light* of *nature*, that the *Ideas*, which are in me, are (as it were) *Pictures*, which may eaſily *come ſhort* of the *perfection* of thoſe things from whence they are taken, but cannot *contain* any thing *greater* or *more perfect* then them: And the *longer* and *more diligently* I pry into theſe things, ſo much the more *clearly* and *diſtinctly* do I diſcover them to be *true*.

But what ſhall I conclude from hence? Thus, that if the *objective reallity* of any of my *Ideas* be *ſuch*, that it cannot be in me either *formarlly* or *eminently*, and that therefore I cannot be the *cauſe* of *that Idea*, from hence it neceſſarily Follows, that *I alone* do not only *exiſt*, but that ſome o-

ther thing, which is the *cauſe* of that *Idea*, does *exiſt alſo*.

But if I can find no *ſuch Idea* in me, I have no argument to perſwade me of the *exiſtence* of any thing beſides my ſelf for I have diligently enquired, and hitherto I could diſcover no other *perſwaſive*.

Some of theſe *Ideas* there are (beſides that which repreſents *my ſelf* to *my ſelf*, of which in this place I cannot doubt) which repreſent to me, one of them a *God*, others of them *Corporeal* and *Inanimate* things, ſome of them *Angels*, others *Animals*, and laſtly ſome of them which exhibite to me *men like my ſelf*.

As touching thoſe that repreſent *Men* or *Angels* or *Animals*, I eaſily underſtand that they may be *made up* of thoſe *Ideas* which I have of *my ſelf*, of *Corporeal* things, and of *God*, tho there were neither *man* (but my ſelf) nor *Angel*, nor *Animal* in being

And as to the *Ideas* of *Corporeal* things, I find nothing in them of that *perfection*, but it may proceed from my ſelf; for if I look into them more narrowly, and examine them more particularly, as yeſterday (*in the ſecond Medit.*) I did the *Idea* of

Wax,

Wax, I find there are but few things which I perceive *clearly* and *distinctly* in them, viz. *Magnitude* or *extension* in *Longitude*, *Latitude*, and *Profundity*, the *Figure* or *shape* which ariſes from the *termination* of that *Extenſion*, the *Poſition* or *place* which divers *Figured Bodies* have in *reſpect* of each other, their *motion* or *change of place*; to which may be added, their *ſubſtance*, *continuance*, and *number*; as to the other, ſuch as are, *Light*, *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Smels*, *Taſts*, *Heat*, and *Cold*, with the other *tactile qualities*, I have but very *obſcure* and *confuſed thoughts* of them, ſo that I know not, whether they are *true* or *falſe*, that is to ſay, whether the *Ideas* I have of them are the *Ideas* of *things* which *really are*, or *are not*. For altho *falſhood formally* and *properly* ſo called, conſiſts only in the *judgement* (as before I have obſerved) yet there is an other ſort of *material falſhood* in *Ideas*, when they repreſent a *thing* as *really exiſtent*, tho it does *not exiſt*; ſo, for example, the *Ideas* I have of *heat* and *cold* are ſo *obſcure* and *confuſed*, that I cannot collect from them, whether *cold* be a *privation* of *heat*, or *heat* a *privation* of *cold*, or whether

ther either of them be a *real quality*, or whether neither of them be *real*. And ſince every *Idea* muſt be *like* the thing it repreſents, if it be *true* that *cold* is nothing but the *privation* of *heat*, that *Idea* which repreſents it to me as a thing *real* and *poſitive* may deſervedly be called *falſe*. The ſame may be apply'd to other Ideas.

And now I ſee no neceſſity why I ſhould aſſigne any other *Author* of theſe *Ideas* but *my ſelf*; for if they are *falſe*, that is, repreſent things that *are not*, I know by the *light* of *nature* that they proceed from *nothing*; that is to ſay, I harbour them upon no other account, but becauſe my *nature* is *deficient* in ſomething, and *imperfect*. But if they are *true*, yet ſeeing I diſcover ſo little *reality* in them, that that very *reality* ſcarce *ſeems* to *be realy*, I ſee no reaſon why I my ſelf ſhould not be the *Author* of them.

But alſo ſome of thoſe very *Ideas* of *Corporeal* things which are *clear* and *diſtinct*, I may ſeem to have borrow'd from the *Idea* I have of *my ſelf*, viz. *Subſtance*, *duration*, *number*, and the like; For when I conceive a *ſtone* to be a *ſubſtance*

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(that is, *a thing apt of it ſelf to exiſt*) and alſo that I *my ſelf* am a *ſubſtance*, tho I conceive *my ſelf* a *thinking ſubſtance* and *not extended*, and the *ſtone* an *extended ſubſtance* and *not thinking*, by which there is a great *diverſity* between both the *conceptions*, yet they *agree* in this, that they are *both ſubſtances*. So when I conceive my ſelf as *now* in being, and alſo remember, that *heretofore* I *have been*; and ſince I have *divers* thoughts, which I can *number* or *count*; from hence it is that I come by the notions of *duration* and *number*; which afterwards I apply to other things.

As to thoſe other things, of which the *Idea* of a *body* is made up, as *extenſion*, *figure*, *place* and *motion*, they are not *formally* in me, ſeeing I am only a *thinking thing*; yet ſeeing they are only certain *modes* of *ſubſtance*, and I my ſelf alſo am a *ſubſtance*, they may ſeem to be in me *eminently*.

*Wherefore there only Remains the *Idea* of a *God*, wherein I muſt conſider whether there be not ſomething included, which cannot poſſibly have its *original* from me. By the word *God*, I mean a cer-

certain *Infinite Subſtance*, *Independent*, *Omniſcient*, *Almighty*, by whom both *I my ſelf*, and every thing elſe that *is* (if any thing do *Actualy exiſt*) was created. All which *Attributes* are of ſuch an *high nature*, that the more attentively I conſider them, the leſs I conceive my ſelf poſſible to be the *Author* of theſe notions.

From what therefore has been ſaid I muſt conclude that there is a *God*; for tho the *Idea* of *ſubſtance* may ariſe in me, becauſe that I my ſelf am a *ſubſtance*, yet I could not have the *Idea* of an *Infinite ſubſtance* (ſeing I my ſelf am *finite*) unleſs it proceeded from a *ſubſtance* which is *really Infinite*. Neither ought I to think that I have no *true Idea* of *Infinity*, or that I perceive it only by the *negation* of what is *finite*, as I conceive *reſt* and *darkneſs* by the *negation* or *abſence* of *motion* or *light*. But on the contrary I plainly underſtand, that there is *more reality* in an *Infinite ſubſtance*, then in a *Finite*; and that therefore the *perception* of an *Infinite* (as *God*) is *antecedent* to the *notion* I have of a *finite* (as *my ſelf*) For how ſhould I know that I *doubt* or *deſire*, that is to ſay, that I *want* ſomething, and that I am *not*

altogether

altogether perfect, unless I had the *Idea* of a *being more perfect* then *my self*, by *comparing* my self to which I may discover my own *Imperfections*.

Neither can it be said that this *Idea* of *God* is *false Materialiter*, and that therefore it *proceeds* from *nothing*, as before I observed of the *Ideas* of *heat* and *cold*, *&c.* For on the contrary, seeing this *notion* is most *clear* and *distinct*, and contains in it self more *objective reality* then any other *Idea*, none can be more *true* in it self, nor in which less *suspition* of *falshood* can be found. This *Idea* (I say) of a *being infinitely perfect* is most *true*, for tho it may be supposed that such a *being* does *not exist*, yet it cannot be supposed that the *Idea* of such a *being* exhibites to me nothing *real*, as before I have said of the *Idea* of *cold*. This *Idea* also is most *clear* and *distinct*, for whatever I perceive *clearly* and *distinctly* to be *real*, and *true*, and *perfect*, is wholy *contain'd* in this *Idea* of *God*.

Neither can it be objected, that I cannot *comprehend* an *Infinite*, or that there are innumerable other things in *God*, which I can neither *conceive*, nor in the least *think upon*; for it is of the *very nature*

ture of an *Infinite* not to be *apprehendable* by *me* who am *finite*. And 'tis ſufficient to me to prove this my *Idea* of *God* to be the moſt *true*, the moſt *clear*, and the moſt *diſtinct Idea* of all thoſe *Ideas* I have, upon this *account*, that I underſtand that *God* is *not to be underſtood*, and that I judge that whatever I *clearly* perceive and know *Implys* any *perfection*, as alſo perhaps other innumerable *perfections*, which I am ignorant of, are in *God* either *formally* or *eminently*.

Doubt. But perhaps *I am* ſomething *more* then I take my ſelf to *be*, and perhaps all theſe *perfections* which I attribute to *God*, are *potentially* in me, tho at preſent they do not ſhew themſelves, and break into action. For I am now fully experienced that my *Knowledge* may be *encreaſed*, and I ſee nothing that hinders why it may not *encreaſe* by degrees in *Infinitum*, nor why by my *knowledge* ſo *encreaſed* I may not attain to the other *perfections* of *God*: nor laſtly, why the *power* or *aptitude* of *having* theſe perfections may not be ſufficient to produce the *Idea* of them in *me*.

Solution. But none of theſe will do; for

for firſt, tho it be true that my *Knowledge* is capable of being *increaſed*, and that many things are in me *potentially*, which *actually* are not, yet none of theſe go to the making an *Idea* of *God*, in which I conceive nothing *potentially*, for tis a certain argument of *imperfection* that a thing *may be encreaſed Gradually*. Moreover, tho my knowledge may be *more* and *more encreaſed*, yet I know that it can never be *actually Infinite*, for it can never arrive to that *height* of *perfection*, which admits not of an *higher degree*. But I conceive God to be *actually* ſo *Infinite*, that nothing can be *added* to his *perfections*. And laſtly, I perceive that the *objective being* of an *Idea* cannot be *produced* only by the *potential being* of a *thing* (which in proper ſpeech is *nothing*) but requires an *actual* or *formal being* to its *production*.

Of all which forementioned things there is nothing that is not *evident* by the *light* of *reaſon* to any one that will diligently conſider them. Yet becauſe that (when I am careleſs, and the *Images* of *ſenſible* things *blind* my *underſtanding*) I do not ſo eaſily call to mind the reaſons, why the *Idea* of a *being more perfect* then

my

my ſelf ſhould of neceſſity proceed from a *being* which is *really more perfect*; It will be requiſite to enquire further, whether *I*, who have this *Idea*, can poſſibly *be*, unleſs *ſuch* a *being* did *exiſt*. To which end let me aske, *from whence* ſhould I *be*? From *my ſelf*? or from my *Parents*? or from any other thing *leſs perfect* then *God*? for nothing can be thought or ſuppoſed *more perfect*, or *equally perfect* with *God*.

But firſt, If *I* were from my ſelf, I ſhould neither *doubt*, nor *deſire*, nor *want* any thing, for I ſhould have given my ſelf all thoſe *perfections*, of which I have any *Idea*, and conſequently I my ſelf ſhould be *God*; and I cannot think that thoſe things I *want*, are to be acquired with *greater difficulty* then thoſe things I *have*; but on the contrary, tis manifeſt, that it were much more *difficult* that *I* (that is, *a ſubſtance* that *thinks*) ſhould *ariſe* out of *nothing*, then that I ſhould *acquire* the *knowledge* of many things whereof I am *Ignorant*, which is only the *accident* of that *ſubſtance*. And certainly If I had that *greater thing* (viz *being*) from my ſelf, I ſhould not have *denyed* my ſelf (not only thoſe things which may be eaſier ac-

quired,

quired, but alſo) All thoſe things, which I perceived are contain'd in the *Idea* of a *God*; and the reaſon is, for that no other things *ſeem* to me to be *more difficultly* done, and certainly if they were *Really more difficult*, they would *ſeem* more *difficult* to me (if whatever *I have*, I *have* from my ſelf) for in thoſe things I ſhould find my *Power* put to a ſtop.

Neither can I Evade the force of theſe Arguments by ſuppoſing my ſelf to *have alwaies Been*, *what now I am*, and that therefore I need not ſeek for an *Author* of my *Being*. For the *Durance* or *Continuation* of my life may be *divided* into *Innumerable Parts*, each of which does not at all *depend* on the *Other Parts*; Therefore it will not follow, that becauſe *a while ago*, *I was*, I muſt of neceſſity *now Be*. I ſay, this will not follow, Unleſs, I ſuppoſe ſome *Cauſe* to *Create me* (as it were) *anew* for *this* Moment (that is, *Conſerve me*) For 'tis evident to one that Conſiders the Nature of *Duration*, that the ſame *Power* and *Action* is requiſite to the *Conſervation* of a Thing each *Moment* of its *Being*, as there is to the *Creation* of that Thing *anew*, if it did *not exiſt*. So that 'tis one

of thoſe *Principles* which are *Evident* by the *Light* of *Nature*: that the *Act* of *Conſervation* differs only *Ratione* (as the Philoſophers term it) from the *Act of Creation.*

Wherefore I ought to ask my ſelf this Queſtion, whether *I*, who *now* Am; have any *Power* to *Cauſe* my ſelf to *Be hereafter?* (for had I any ſuch *power*, I ſhould certainly *know* of it, ſeeing I am nothing but a *Thinking Thing*, or at leaſt at preſent I onely treat of that part of me, which is a *Thing* that *Thinks*) to which, I anſwer, that I can diſcover no ſuch *Power* in Me; And conſequently, I evidently know that *I depend* on ſome *Other being diſtinct* from *my ſelf.*

But what if *I* ſay that perhaps this *Being* is not *God*, but that *I* am produced either by my *Parents*, or ſome other *Cauſes leſs perfect* then *God*? *In* anſwer to which let me conſider (as *I* have ſaid before that 'tis *manifeſt* that whatever is in the *effect*, *ſo much* at leaſt ought to be in the *cauſe*; and therefore ſeeing *I* am a thing that *thinks*, and have in me an *Idea* of *God*, it will confeſſedly follow, that whatever ſort of *cauſe I* aſſign of my *own Being*, it alſo

alſo muſt be a *Thinking Thing*, and muſt have an *Idea* of all thoſe *Perfections*, which I attribute to *God*; Of which *Cauſe* it may be again Asked, whether it be *from it ſelf*, or from any other *Cauſe*? If *from it ſelf*, 'tis evident (from what has been ſaid) that it muſt be *God*; For ſeeing it has the *Power* of *Exiſting of it ſelf*, without doubt it has alſo the *power* of *actually Poſſeſſing* all thoſe *Perfections* whereof it has an *Idea* in it ſelf, that is, all thoſe *Perfections* which I conceive in *God*. But if it Be from an *other Cauſe*, it may again be asked of that *Cauſe* whether it be *of it ſelf*, or from an *other*; Till at length We arrive at the *Laſt Cauſe* of All, Which will Be *God*. For 'tis evident, that this *Enquiry* will not admit of *Progreſſus in Infinitum*, eſpecially when at Preſent I treat not only of that Cauſe which at *firſt made* Me; But chiefly of that which *conſerves* me in this *Inſtant* time.

Neither can it be ſuppoſed that many *partial Cauſes* have *concurred* to the making Me, and that I received the *Idea* of one of *Gods perfections* from *One* of them, and from an *other* of them the *Idea* of an *other*; and that therefore all

theſe Perfections are to be found *ſcattered* in the World, but not all of them *Joyn'd* in any one which may Be *God*. For on the contrary, *Unity*, *Simplicity*, or the *inſeparability* of All Gods Attributes is one of the *chief Perfections* which I conceive in Him; and certainly the *Idea* of the *Unity* of the *Divine Perfections* could not be *created* in me by any other *cauſe*, then by *That*, from whence I have received the *Ideas* of his other *perfections*; For 'tis Impoſſible to make me conceive theſe *perfections*, *conjunct* and *inſeparable*, unleſs he ſhould alſo make me know what *perfections* theſe *are*.

Laſtly as touching my *having* my *Being* from my *Parents*. Tho whatever Thoughts I have heretofore harbour'd of Them were *True*, yet certainly they *contribute* nothing to my *conſervation*, neither proceed I from them as *I am* a *Thing* that *Thinks*, for they have onely *prediſpoſed* that *material Thing*, wherein *I*, that is, *my mind* (*which* only at preſent I take for *my ſelf*) *Inhabits*. Wherefore I cannot *now* Queſtion that I am ſprung from them. But I muſt of neceſſity conclude that becauſe *I am*, and becauſe I have an *Idea* of a

Being

Being moſt perfect, that is, of *God*, it evidently follows that *there is a God.*

* Now it only remains for me to examine, how I have received this *Idea* of *God.* For I have neither received it by *means* of *my Senſes*, neither comes it to me *without* my *Forethought*, as the *Ideas* of *ſenſible* things uſe to do, when ſuch things *Work* on the *Organs* of my *Senſe*, or at leaſt *ſeem* ſo to work; Neither is this *Idea* framed by *my ſelf*, for I can neither *detract from*, nor *add* any thing *thereto.* Wherefore I have only to conclude that it is *Innate*, even as the *Idea* of me *my ſelf* is *Natural* to my ſelf.

And truly 'tis not to be Admired that *God* in Creating me ſhould *Imprint* this *Idea* in me, that it may there remain as a *ſtamp impreſſed* by the *Workman God* on *me* his *Work*, neither is it requiſite that this *ſtamp* ſhould be a Thing *different* from the *Work* it ſelf, but 'tis very Credible (from hence only that *God Created* me) that I am made as it were according to his *likeneſs* and *Image*, and that the ſame *likeneſs*, in which the *Idea* of God is contain'd, is *perceived* by Me with the *ſame faculty*, with which I *perceive my Self*; That

That is to ſay, whilſt *I reflect* upon my ſelf. *I* do not only *perceive* that I am an *Imperfect* thing, having my *dependance* upon ſome other thing, and that I am a Thing that Deſires *more* and *better* things *Indefinitely*; But alſo at the ſame time I underſtand, that *He* on whom I *depend* contains in him all thoſe *wiſh'd for things* (not only *Indefinitely* and *Potentially*, but) *Really*, *Infinitely*; and that therefore he is *God*. The whole ſtreſs of which * Argument lies thus, becauſe I know it Impoſſible for Me to Be of the ſame Nature I am, *Viz.* Having the *Idea* of a *God* in me, unleſs really there were a *God*, a *God* (I ſay) that very *ſame God*, whoſe *Idea I* have in my *Mind* (that is, Having all thoſe *perfections*, which I cannot *comprehend* but can as it were *think upon them*) and who is not *ſubject* to any *Defects*.

By which 'tis evident that *God* is no *Deceiver*; for 'tis manifeſt by the *Light* of *Nature*, that all *fraud* and *deceit* depends on ſome *defect*. But before I proſecute this any farther, or pry into other *Truthes* which may be deduced from this, I am willing here to ſtop, and dwell upon the Contemplation of this *God*, to

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Conſider with my ſelf His *Divine Attributes*, to behold, admire, and adore the Lovelineſs of this *Immenſe light*, as much as poſſibly I am able to accompliſh with my *dark* Underſtanding. For as by *Faith* we *believe* that the greateſt *happineſs* of the *next Life* conſiſts alone in the *Contemplation* of the *Divine Majeſty*, ſo we *find* by *Experience* that now we receive from thence the greateſt *pleaſure*, whereof we are capable in *this Life*; Tho it be much more *Imperfect* then that in the *Next*.

MEDITAT. IV.

Of Truth and Falſhood.

OF late it has been ſo common with me to withdraw *my Mind* from my *ſences*, and I have ſo throughly conſider'd how few things there are appertaining to *Bodies* that are *truly* perceived, and that there are more Things touching *Mans mind*, and yet more concerning *God*, which are *well known*; that now without any difficulty *I* can turn my

Thoughts from things *ſenſible*, to thoſe which are only *Intelligible*, and *Abſtracted* from *Matter*. And truely *I* have a much more *diſtinct Idea* of a *Mans mind* (as it is a *Thinking Thing*, having no *Corporeal Dimenſions* of *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Thickneſs*, nor having any other *Corporeal Quality*) then the *Idea* of any *Corporeal Thing* can be. And when I reflect upon my ſelf, and conſider how that I *doubt*, that is, am an *imperfect dependent Being*, I from hence Collect ſuch a *clear* and *diſtinct Idea* of an *Independent perfect Being*, which is *God*, and from hence only that *I have ſuch an Idea*, that is, becauſe *I* that have this *Idea* do *my ſelf Exiſt*; I do ſo *clearly* conclude that *God alſo Exiſts*, and that on him my *Being depends* each Minute; That I am Confident nothing can be known more *Evidently* and *Certainly* by *Humane Underſtanding*.

And now *I* ſeem to perceive a *Method* by which, (from this Contemplation of the *true God*, in whom the Treaſures of *Knowledge* and *Wiſdome* are Hidden) *I* may attain the *Knowledg* of other Things.

And firſt, *I* know 'tis impoſſible that this *God* ſhould *deceive* me; For in all

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cheating and *deceipt* there is ſomething of *imperfection*; and tho to be *able* to *deceive* may ſeem to be an Argument of *ingenuity* and *power*, yet without doubt to *have* the *Will* of *deceiving* is a ſign of *Malice* and *Weakneſs*, and therefore is not *Incident* to *God*.

I have alſo found in my ſelf a *Judicative faculty*, which certainly (as all other things I poſſeſs) I have received from *God*; and ſeeing he will not *deceive* me, he has ſurely given me ſuch a *Judgement*, that I can *never Err*, whilſt I make a *Right Uſe* of it. Of which truth I can make no doubt, unleſs it ſeems, that From hence it will follow, That therefore *I can never Err*; for if whatever I have, I have from *God*, and if he gave me no *Faculty* of *Erring*, I may ſeem not to be *able to Err*. And truly ſo it is whilſt I think upon *God*, and wholly convert my ſelf to the *conſideration* of him, I find no occaſion of *Error* or *Deceit*; but yet when I return to the *Contemplation* of *my ſelf*, I find my ſelf liable to *Innumerable Errors*. Enquiring into the *cauſe* of which, I find in my ſelf an *Idea*, not only a *real* and *poſitive one* of a *God*, that is, of a *Being infinitely perfect*,

but

but alſo (as I may ſo ſpeak) a *Negative Idea* of *Nothing*; that is to ſay, I am ſo conſtituted between God and Nothing or between a perfect *Being* and *No-being*, that as I am *Created* by the *Higheſt Being*, I have nothing in Me by which I may be *deceived* or drawn into *Error*; but as I pertake in a manner of *Nothing*, or of a *No-Being*, that is, as I my ſelf am *not* the *Higheſt Being*, and as I *want* many *perfections*, 'tis no Wonder that I ſhould be *Deceived*.

By which I underſtand that *Error* * (as it is *Error*) is not any *real Being* dependant on *God*, but it is only a *Defect*; And that therefore to make me *Err* there is not requiſite a *faculty* of *Erring* given me by *God*, but only it ſo happens that I *Err* meerly becauſe the *Judicative faculty*, which he has given me, is not *Infinite*.

But yet this Account is not fully *ſatisfactory*; for *Error* is not only a meer *Negation*, but 'tis a *Privation*, or a *want* of a certain *Knowledge*, which *ought* (as it were) to be in me. And when I conſider the *Nature* of *God*, it ſeems impoſſible that he ſhould give me any *faculty* which is not *perfect* in its *kind*, or which ſhould *want* any of its *due perfections*; for if by how

how much the more *skilful* the *Workman* is, by ſo much the *Perfecter Works* proceed from him. What can be made by the *Great Maker* of all things which is not *fully perfect*? For I cannot Doubt but *God* may *Create* me ſo that I may *never* be *deceived*, neither can I doubt but that he *Wills* whatever is *Beſt*; Is it therefore *better* for me to be *deceived*, or not to be *deceived*?

Theſe things when I Conſider more heedfully, it comes into my Mind, Firſt, that 'tis no cauſe of Admiration that *God* ſhould do Things whereof I can give no account, nor muſt I therefore doubt his *Being*, becauſe there are many things done by him, and I not comprehend *Why* or *How* they are done; for ſeeing I now know that my *Nature* is very *Weak* and *Finite*, and that the *Nature* of *God* is *Immenſe*, *Incomprehenſible*, *Infinite*; from hence I muſt fully, underſtand, that he can do numberleſs things, the *Cauſes* whereof lie *hidden* to Me. Upon which account only I eſteem all thoſe Cauſes which are Drawn from the *End* (viz. *Final Cauſes*) as of no uſe in *Natural Philoſophy*, for I cannot without Raſhneſs Think my ſelf

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ſelf *able* to Diſcover *Gods* Deſignes.

I perceive this alſo, that whenever we endeavour to know whether the *Works* of *God* are *perfect*, we muſt not Reſpect any *one kind* of Creature *ſingly*, but the *Whole Univerſe* of *Beings*; for perhaps what (if conſidered *alone*) may Deſervedly ſeem *Imperfect*, yet (as it is a *part* of the *World*) is moſt *perfect*; and tho ſince I have *doubted* of all things, I have diſcover'd nothing *certainly* to *Exiſt*, but *my ſelf*, and *God*, yet ſince I have Conſider'd the *Omnipotency* of *God*, I cannot deny, but that many other things *are made* (or at leaſt, *may be made*) by him, ſo that I my ſelf *may be* a *part* of this *Univerſe*.

Furthermore, coming nigher to my ſelf, and enquiring what theſe *Errors* of mine, are (which are the Only Arguments of my *Imperfection*)* I find them to *depend* on *two concurring Cauſes*, on my *faculty* of *Knowing*, and on my *faculty* of *Chooſing* or *Freedome* of my *Will*, that is to ſay, from my *Underſtanding*, and my *Will together*. For by my *Underſtanding alone* I only perceive *Ideas*, whereon I make *Judgments*, wherein (*preciſely* ſo taken) there can be no *Error*, *properly* ſo called;

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for tho perhaps there may be numberleſs things, whoſe *Ideas* I have *not* in Me, yet I am not *properly* to be ſaid *Deprived* of them, but only *negatively wanting* them; and I cannot prove that *God ought* to have given me a *greater faculty* of *Knowing*. And tho I underſtand him to be a *skilful Workman*, yet I cannot Think, that he *ought* to have put all thoſe *perfections* in *each* Work of his *ſingly*, with which he might have *endowed ſome* of them.

Neither can I complain that *God* has not given me a *Will*, or *Freedom* of *Choiſe*, *large* and *perfect* enough; for I have experienced that 'tis *Circumſcribed* by *no Bounds*.

And 'tis worth our taking notice, that I have no other thing in me ſo *perfect* and ſo *Great*, but I Underſtand that there may be *Perfecter* and *Greater*, for if (for Example) I conſider the *Faculty* of *Underſtanding*, I preſently perceive that in me 'tis very *ſmall* and *Finite*, and alſo at the ſame time I form to my ſelf an *Idea* of an other *Underſtanding* not only *much Greater*, but the *Greateſt* and *Infinite*, which I perceive to belong to *God*. In the ſame manner if enquire into *memory* or *imagination*, or a-

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ny other faculties, I find them in my ſelf *Weak* and *Circumſcribed*, but in *God* I Underſtand them to be *Infinite*, there is therefore only my *Will* or *Freedome* of *Choice*, which I find to be *ſo Great*, that I cannot frame to my ſelf an *Idea* of *One Greater*, ſo that 'tis by this *chiefly* by which I Underſtand my ſelf to *Bear* the *likeneſs* and *Image* of *God*. For tho the *Will* in *God* be without compariſon *Greater* then Mine, both as to the *Knowledge* and *Power* which are *Joyn'd* therewith, which make it more *ſtrong* and *Effective*, and alſo as to the *Object* thereof, for *God* can apply himſelf to *more* things then I can. Yet being taken *Formally* and *Preciſely* *Gods Will* ſeems *no greater* then Mine. For the *Freedome* of *Will* conſiſts only in this, that we can *Do*, or *not Do* ſuch a Thing (that is, *affirm* or *deny*, *proſecute* or *avoid*) or rather in this Only, that we are *ſo carried* to a Thing which is *propoſed* by Our *Intellect* to *Affirm* or *Deny*, *Proſecute* or *Shun*, that we are *ſenſible*, that we are *not Determin'd* to the *Choice* or *Averſion* thereof, by any *outward Force*.

Neither is it Requiſite to make one *Free* that he ſhould have an *Inclination* to *both* ſides. For on the contrary, by how much the

the more *ſtrongly* I am inclined to *one* ſide (whether it be that I *evidently perceive* therein Good or Evil, or Whether it be that *God has ſo diſpoſed* my *Inward Thoughts*) By ſo much the *more Free* am I in my *Choice*.

Neither truly do *Gods Grace* or *Natural Knowledge* take away from my *Liberty*, but rather *encreaſe* and *ſtrengthen* it. For that *indifference* which I find in my ſelf, when no Reaſon inclines me *more* to *one ſide*, then to *the other*, is the *meaneſt* ſort of *Liberty*, and is ſo far from being a ſign of *perfection*, that it only argues a *defect* or *negation* of *Knowledge*; for if I ſhould always *Clearly ſee* what were *True* and *Good* I ſhould never *deliberate* in my *Judgement* or *Choice*, and Conſequently, tho I were *perfectly Free*, yet I ſhould never be *Indifferent*.

From all which, I perceive that neither the *Power* of *Willing preciſely* ſo taken, which I have from *God*, is the *Cauſe* of my *Errors*, it being moſt *full* and *perfect* in its kind; Neither alſo the *Power* of *Underſtanding*, for whatever I *Underſtand* (ſince 'tis from God that I *Underſtand* it) I *underſtand aright*, nor can I be therein *Deceived*.

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From *Whence* therefore proceed all my *Errors*? To which, I anſwer, that they proceed from *hence* only, that ſeeing the *Will* expatiates it ſelf *farther* then the *Underſtanding*, I keep it not within the *ſame bounds* with my *Underſtanding*, but often extend it to thoſe things which I *Underſtand not*, to which things it being *Indifferent*, it eaſily Declines from what is *True* and *Good*; and conſequently I am *Deceived* and *Commit ſin*. * Thus, for example, when lately I ſet my ſelf to enquire, Whether any thing doth *Exiſt*, and found that from my ſetting *my ſelf* to Examine ſuch a thing, it evidently follows that I *my ſelf Exiſt*, I could not but *Judge*, what I ſo *clearly Underſtood*, to be *true*, not that I was *forced* thereto by any *outward impulſe*, but becauſe a *ſtrong Propenſion* in my *Will* did follow this *Great Light* in my *Underſtanding*, ſo that I believed it ſo much the more *freely* and *willingly*, by how much the leſs *indifferent* I was thereto. But now I underſtand, not only, that *I Exiſt* as I am a *Thing* that *Thinks*, but I alſo meet with a certain *Idea* of a *Corporeal Nature*, and it ſo happens that I *doubt*, whether that *Thinking Nature* that is in me be *Diffe-*

rent

rent from that *Corporeal Nature*, or Whether they are *both the ſame*: but in this *I* ſuppoſe that *I* have found no Argument to *incline* me *either ways*, and therefore *I* am *Indifferent* to *affirm* or *deny either*, or to *Judge nothing* of *either*; But this *indifferency* extends it ſelf not only to thoſe things of which I am *clearly ignorant*, but generally to all thoſe things which are *not* ſo very *evidently known* to me at the Time when my *Will Deliberates* of them; for tho never ſo probable *Gueſſes incline* me to *one* ſide, yet the Knowing that they are only *Conjectures*, and not indubitable *reaſons*, is enough to Draw my *Aſſent* to the *Contrary* Part. Which Lately *I* have ſufficiently experienced, when *I* ſuppoſed all thoſe things (which formerly *I* aſſented to as moſt *True*) as very *Falſe*, for this *Reaſon* only that *I* found my ſelf *able* to doubt of them in ſome manner.

If I abſtain from *paſſing* my *Judgment*, when I do *not clearly* and *diſtinctly* enough perceive what is *Truth*, 'tis evident that I do *well*, and that I am *not deceived*: But if I *affirm* or *deny*, then 'tis that I *abuſe* the *freedome* of my *will*, and if I turn my ſelf to that part which is *falſe*, I am *deceived*;

but if I *embrace* the *contrary* Part, 'tis but *by chance* that I light on the *Truth*, yet I ſhall not therefore be Blameleſs, for 'tis Manifeſt by the *light* of *Nature* that the *Perception* of the *Underſtanding ought* to preceed the *Determination* of the *Will*. And 'tis in this *abuſe* of *Free-Will* that That *Privation* conſiſts, which Conſtitutes *Error*; I ſay there is a *Privation* in the *Action* as it proceeds from Me, but not in the *Faculty* which I have received from *God*, nor in the *Action* as it *depends* on *him*.

Neither have I any Reaſon to Complain that God has not given me a *larger Intellective Faculty*, or more *Natural Light*, for 'tis a neceſſary Incident to a *finite Underſtanding* that it ſhould not Underſtand *All* things, and 'tis Incident to a *Created Underſtanding* to be *Finite*: and I have more Reaſon to thank him for what he has *beſtowed* upon me (tho he *owed* me nothing) then to think my ſelf *Robbed* by him of thoſe things which he *never gave me*.

Nor have I Reaſon to Complain that he has given me a *Will* larger then my *Underſtanding*: for ſeeing the *Will* Conſiſts in *one* thing only, and as it were in an *Indiviſible* (viz. *to Will*, or *not to Will*) it ſeems con-

contrary to its nature that it ſhould be *leſs* then 'tis; And certainly by how much the *Greater* it is, ſo much the more *Thankful* I ought to be to *him*; that Gave it me.

Neither can I Complain that God *concurrs* with me in the Production of thoſe *Voluntary Actions* or *Judgements* in which I am *deceived*: for thoſe *Acts* as they *depend* on *God* are altogether *True* and *Good*; and I am in ſome meaſure *more perfect* in that I can *ſo Act*, then if I could *not*: for that *Privation*, in which the *Ratio Formalis* of *Falſhood* and *Sin* conſiſts, wants not the *Concourſe* of *God*; For it is *not A Thing*, and having reſpect to him as its *Cauſe*, ought not to be called *Privation*, but *Negation*; for certainly 'tis no *Imperfection* in *God*, that he has given me a *freedome* of *Aſſenting* or *not Aſſenting* to ſome things, the *clear* and *diſtinct* Knowledge whereof he has not *Imparted* to my *Underſtanding*; but certainly 'tis an *Imperfection* in me, that I *abuſe* this *liberty*, and *paſs* my *Judgement* on thoſe things which I do *not Rightly* Underſtand.

Yet I ſee that 'tis Poſſible with *God* to effect that (tho' I ſhould remain *Free*, and

of a *Finite Knowledge*) I ſhould *never Err*, that is, if he had endowed my *Underſtanding* with a *clear* and *diſtinct* Knowledge of all things whereof I ſhould ever have an *Occaſion* of *deliberating*; or if he had only ſo firmly fix'd in my Mind, that I ſhould never forget, this, *That I muſt never Judge of a thing which I do not clearly and diſtinctly Underſtand*; Either of which things had *God* done, I eaſily perceive that I (as conſider'd in my ſelf) ſhould be *more perfect* then now I am, yet nevertheleſs I cannot deny but that there *may be a greater perfection* in the *whole Univerſe* of Things, for that ſome of its parts are Obnoxius to *Errors*, and ſome not, then if they were all *alike*. And I have no Reaſon to Complain, that it has pleaſed God, that I ſhould *Act* on the *Stage* of this *World* a *Part* not the *chief* and *moſt perfect* of all; Or that I ſhould not be able to abſtain from *Error* in the *firſt way* above ſpecifi'd, which depends upon the *Evident Knowledge* of thoſe things whereof *I deliberate*; Yet that I may abſtain from *Error* by the *other means* abovemention'd, which depends only on this, *That I Judge not of any Thing, the truth whereof is not Evident.*

For

For tho I have experienced in my ſelf this *Infirmity*, that I cannot *always* be intent upon *one* and the *ſame* Knowledge, yet *I* may by a *continued* and *often repeated* Meditation bring this to paſs, that as often as *I* have uſe of this Rule *I* may Remember it, by which means I may Get (as it were) an *habit* of *not erring*.

*I*n which thing ſeeing the *greateſt* and *chief perfection* of *Man* conſiſts, *I* repute my ſelf to have gain'd much by this days *Meditation*, for that therein *I* have diſcover'd the *Cauſe* of *Error*, *and Falſhood*; which certainly can be no other then what *I* have now Declared; for whenever in Paſſing my Judgement, *I* bridle my *Will* ſo that it extend it ſelf *only* to thoſe things which *I clearly* and *diſtinctly* perceive, it is impoſſible that I can *Err*. For doubtleſs All *clear* and *diſtinct* Perception is *ſomething*, and therefore cannot *proceed* from *Nothing*, but muſt neceſſarily have *God* for its *Author* (*God*, I ſay, Who is *infinitely Perfect*, and who *cannot Deceive*) and therefore it Muſt be *True*.

Nor have I this Day learnt only what I muſt *beware off* that I be not *deceived*, but alſo what I muſt *Do* to Diſcover *Truth*,

for *That* I ſhall certainly find, if I fully Apply my ſelf to thoſe things *only*, which I *perfectly* underſtand; and if I diſtinguiſh between thoſe and what I apprehend but *confuſedly* and *obſcurely*; Both which hereafter I ſhall endeavour.

MEDITAT. V.

Of the Eſſence *of Things* Material. *And herein Again of* God. *And that he does* Exiſt.

THere are yet remaining many Things concerning *Gods Attributes*, and many things concerning the *nature* of *my ſelf* or of my *Mind*, which ought to be ſearched into: but theſe perhaps I ſhall ſet upon at ſome other Opportunity. And at Preſent nothing ſeems to me more requiſite (ſeeing I have diſcover'd what I muſt *avoid*, and what I muſt *Do* for the *Attaining* of *Truth*) then that I imploy my Endeavours to free my ſelf from thoſe doubts into which I have lately fallen

fallen, and that I try whether I can have any certainty of Material Things.

But before I enquire whether there be any ſuch things *Really Exiſtent without* Me, I ought to conſider the *Ideas* of thoſe things, as they are in my Thoughts and try which of them are *Diſtinct*, which *confuſed*.

In which ſearch I find that I *diſtinctly imagine Quantity*, that which Philoſophers commonly call *continued*, that is to ſay, the *Extenſion* of that *Quantity* or thing *continued* into *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Thickneſs*, I can *count* in it divers Parts, to which parts I can aſſign *Bigneſs*, *Figure*, *Poſition*, and *Local Motion*, to which *Local Motion* I can aſſign *Duration*. Neither are only theſe *Generals* plainly diſcover'd and known by Me, but alſo by attentive Conſideration, I perceive Innumerable *particulars* concerning the *Shapes*, *Number*, and *Motion* of Theſe Bodies; The *Truth* whereof is ſo *evident*, and *agreeable* to my *Nature*, that when I firſt diſcover'd them, I ſeemed not ſo much to have *Learnt* any thing that is *new*, as to have only *remembred* what I have known *before*, or only to have thought on thoſe things which were in me *before*, tho this be

the first time that I have examin'd them so *diligently*.

One thing there is worthy my Consideration, which is, that I find in my self innumerable *Ideas* of certain things, which tho perhaps they *exist no where without* Me, yet they cannot Be said to be *Nothing*; and tho they are *Thought* upon by me at my *will* and *pleasure*, yet they are not *made* by *Me*, but have their own *True* and *Immutable Natures*. As when, for example, * I *Imagine* a *Triangle*, tho perhaps such a *Figure Exists no where* out of my *Thoughts*, nor ever *will Exist*, yet the *Nature* thereof is *determinate*, and its *Essence* or Form is *Immutalle* and *Eternal*, which is neither *made* by me, nor *depends* on my mind, as appears for that many *properties* may be *demonstrated* of this Triangle, *viz.* That its three Angles are equal to two right ones, that to its Greatest Angle the Greatest side is subtended, and such like, which I now *clearly* know whether *I will or not*, tho before *I* never thought on them, when I *imagine* a Triangle, and consequently they could not be invented by Me. And 'tis nothing to the purpose for me to say, that perhaps this *Idea* of a Tri-

Triangle came to me by the Organs of *ſenſe*, becauſe I have ſometimes ſeen bodies of a *Triangular Shape*; for I can think of Innumerable other *Figures*, which I cannot ſuſpect to have come in through my *ſenſes*, and yet I can *Demonſtrate* various *properties* of them, as well as of a *Triangle*, which certainly are all *true*, ſeeing I know them *clearly*, and therefore they are *ſomething*, and not a meer *Nothing*, for 'tis Evident that *what is true is ſomething*.

And now I have ſufficiently Demonſtrated, that *what I clearly perceive, is True*: And tho I had *not demonſtrated* it, yet ſuch is the *Nature* of my *Mind*, that I could not but give my *Aſſent* to what I *ſo* perceive, at leaſt, as long as I *ſo* perceive it; and I remember (heretofore when I moſt of all relied on *ſenſible Objects*) that I held thoſe *Truths* for the moſt *certain* which I *evidently* perceived, ſuch as are concerning *Figures*, *Numbers*, with other parts of *Arithmetick*, and *Geometry*, as alſo whatever relates to *pure* and *abſtracted Mathematicks*.

Now therefore, if from this alone, *That I can frame the Idea of a Thing in my Mind*, it follows, *That whatever I clearly and diſtinctly perceive belonging to a thing*, does

Really

Really belong to it; Cannot I from hence draw an Argument to Prove the *Exiſtence* of a *God*? Certainly I find the *Idea* of a *God*, or *infinitely perfect Being*, as *naturally* in me, as the *Idea* of any *Figure*, or *Number*; and I as *clearly* and *diſtinctly* underſtand that it appertains to his *Nature Always to Be*, as I know that what I can *demonſtrate* of a *Mathematical Figure* or *Number* belongs to the *Nature* of that *Figure* or *Number*: ſo that, tho all things which I have *Meditated* upon theſe three or four days were not *true*, yet I may well be as *certain* of the *Exiſtence* of a *God*, as I have hitherto been of *Mathematical Truths*.

Doubt. Yet this Argument at firſt ſight appears not ſo *evident*, but looks rather like a *ſophiſm*; for ſeeing I am uſed in all other things to *Diſtinguiſh Exiſtence* from *Eſſence*, I can eaſily perſwade my ſelf that the *Exiſtence* of *God* may be *diſtinguiſh'd* from his *Eſſence*, ſo that I may *Imagine* God not to *Exiſt*.

Solution. But conſidering it more ſtrictly, 'tis manifeſt, that the *Exiſtence* of *God* can no more be *ſeperated* from his *Eſſence*, then the *Equality* of the *Three Angles* to *two right ones* can be *ſeperated* from the *Eſſence* of a *Triangle*, or then the *Idea* of a *Mountain*

tain can be *without* the *Idea* of a *valley*; ſo that 'tis no leſs a *Repugnancy* to think of a *God* (that is, *A Being infinitely perfect*) who wants *Exiſtence* (that is, who wants a *Perfection*) then to think of a *Mountain*, to which there is *no Valley adjoyning*.

Doubt. But what if I cannot imagine *God* but as *Exiſting*, or a *Mountain without a Vally*? yet ſuppoſing me to think of a *Mountain with a Vally*, it does not from thence follow, that there *Is a Mountain* in the World; ſo ſuppoſing me to think of a *God* as *Exiſting*, yet does it not follow that *God Really Exiſts*. For my *Thought impoſes* no *neceſſity* on Things, and as I may imagine a *Winged Horſe*, tho no *Horſe* has *Wings*, ſo I may imagine an *exiſting God*, tho no *God exiſt*.

Solution. 'Tis true the *Sophiſm* ſeems to lie in this, yet tho I cannot conceive a *Mountain* but with a *Vally*, it does not from hence follow, that a *Mountain* or *Vally* do *Exiſt*, but this will follow, that whether a *Mountain* or a *Vally do* or *do not Exiſt*, yet they cannot be *ſeperated*: ſo from hence that I cannot think of *God* but as *Exiſting*, it follows that *Exiſtence* is *Inſeperable* from *God*, and therefore that he

Really

Really Exists; Not becauſe my *Thought* does all this, or *Impoſes* any *neceſſity* on any Thing, but contrarily, becauſe the *neceſſity* of the thing it ſelf (*viz.* of *Gods Exiſtence*) *Determines* me to *think* thus; for 'tis not in my Power to think a *God* without *Exiſtence* (that is, *A Being abſolutely perfect* without the *Cheif Perfection*) as it is in my Power to imagine a Horſe either *with* or *without Wings*.

Doubt. And here it cannot be ſaid, that I am forced to ſuppoſe *God Exiſting*, after I have ſuppoſed him *endowed* with all *Perfections*, ſeeing *Exiſtence* is one of them; but that my *Firſt Poſition* (*viz.* His *Abſolute Perfection*) is not *neceſſary*. Thus, for example, 'tis not *neceſſary* for me to think all *Quadrilateral Figures* inſcribed in a *Circle*; But ſuppoſing that I think *ſo*, I am then *neceſſitated* to Confeſs a *Rhombe Inſcribed* therein, and yet this is evidently *Falſe*.

Solution. For tho I am not forced at any time to think of a *God*; yet as often as I caſt my Thoughts on a *Firſt* and *Cheif Being*, and as it were bring forth out of the Treaſury of my Mind an *Idea* thereof, I muſt of neceſſity attribute thereto all Manner of *Perfections*, tho I do not at that time

time *count* them over, or *Remark* each ſingle One; which *neceſſity* is ſufficient to make me hereafter (when I come to conſider *Exiſtence* to be a *Perfection*) conclude *Rightly, That the Firſt and Chief Being does Exiſt.* Thus, for example, I am not obliged at any time to imagine a *Triangle*, yet whenever I pleaſe to Conſider of a *Right-lined Figure* having only *three Angles*, I am then *neceſſitated* to allow it all thoſe *Requiſites* from which I may argue rightly, *That the Three Angles thereof are not Greater then Two Right Ones*, Tho upon the firſt conſideration this came not into my Thought. But when I enquire what Figures may be *inſcribed* within a *Circle*, I am not at all *neceſſitated* to think that all *Quadrilateral Figures* are of that ſort; neither can I poſſibly imagine this, whilſt I admit of nothing, but what I *clearly* and *diſtinctly* Underſtand: and therefore there is a great Difference between theſe *Falſe ſuppoſitions*, and *True natural Ideas*, the *firſt* and *Chief* whereof is that of a *God*; For by many wayes I underſtand *That* not to be a *Fiction depending* on my *Thought*, but an *Image* of a *True* and *Immutable Nature*; As firſt, becauſe I can think

of

of no other thing but *God* to Whoſe *Eſſence Exiſtence* belongs. Next becauſe I cannot Imagine *Two* or *More Gods*, and ſuppoſing that he is *now* only One, I may plainly perceive it *neceſſary* for *Him* to *Have been from Eternity*, and *will Be to Eternity*; And Laſtly becauſe I perceive many Other Things in *God*, Which I cannot *Change*, and from which I cannot *Detract*.

But whatever way of Argumentation I uſe, it comes All at laſt to this one Thing, That I am fully perſwaded of the *Truth* of thoſe things only, which appear to me *clearly* and *diſtinctly*. And tho ſome of thoſe things, which I ſo perceive, are obvious to *every* Man, and ſome are only diſcover'd by Thoſe that ſearch more *nighly*, and enquire more *carefully*, yet when ſuch *truths* are diſcover'd, they are eſteem'd no leſs *certain* than the Others. For Example, Tho it do not ſo eaſily appear, that in a Rightangled Triangle, the ſquare of the Baſe is equal to the ſquares of the ſides, as it appears, that the Baſe is ſubtended under its Largeſt Angle, yet the *firſt Propoſition* is *no leſs certainly* believed when once 'tis perceived, then this *Laſt*.

Thus

Thus in Reference to *God*; certainly, unleſs I am overrun with *Prejudice*, or have my thoughts begirt on all ſides with *ſenſible Objects*, I ſhould acknowledge nothing *before* or *eaſier* then him; For what is more *ſelf-evident* then that there is a *Chief Being*, or then that a *God* (to whoſe *eſſence alone Exiſtence* appertains) does *Exiſt*? And tho ſerious Conſideration is required to perceive thus much, yet *Now*, I am not only equally *certain* of it, as of what ſeems moſt *certain*, but I perceive alſo that the *Truth* of other Things ſo *depends* on it, that without it nothing can ever be *perfectly known*.

For tho my *nature* be *ſuch*, that during the time of my *Clear* and *Diſtinct* Perception, I cannot but believe it *true*; yet my *Nature* is *ſuch* alſo, that I cannot fix the *Intention* of my *Mind* upon one and the ſame thing alwayes, ſo as to perceive it *clearly*, and the Remembrance of what *Judgement* I have formerly made is often ſtirred up, when I ceaſe attending to thoſe reaſons for which I paſſed ſuch a Judgment, other Reaſons may then be produced, which (if I did not *know God*) may eaſily *move* me in my *Opinion*; and by this means

means I ſhall never attain to the *true* and *certain Knowledge* of any Thing, but *Wandring* and *Unſtable opinions*. So, for example, when I conſider the Nature of a Triangle, it plainly appears to me (as underſtanding the Principles of Geometry) that its three Angles are equal to two right ones; And this I muſt of neceſſity think *True* as long as I attend to the *Demonſtration* thereof; but as ſoon as ever I withdraw my Mind from the *Conſideration* of its *Proof* (altho I remember that I have once *Clearly* perceived it) yet perhaps I may *doubt* of Its *Truth*, being as yet *Ignorant* of a *God*; For I may perſwade my ſelf, that I am ſo framed by *Nature*, as to be *deceived* in thoſe things which I imagine my ſelf to perceive moſt *evidently*. Eſpecially when I recollect, that heretofore I have often accounted many things *True* and *Certain*, which afterward upon other Reaſons I have Judged as Falſe. But when I perceive that there is a *God*; becauſe at the ſame time I alſo Underſtand that all things *Depend* on Him, and that he is not a *Deceiver*; and when from hence I Collect that all thoſe Things which I *clearly* and *diſtinctly* perceive are *neceſſarily True*;

tho

tho I have no further Reſpects to thoſe Reaſons which induced me to believe it *True*, yet if I do but remember, that I have *once clearly* and *diſtinctly* perceived it, no Argument can be brought on the contrary, that ſhall make me *doubt*, but that I have *true* and *certain* Knowledge thereof; and not onely of that, but of all other *Truths* alſo which I remember that I have *once Demonſtrated*, ſuch as are *Geometrical Propoſitions* and the like.

What now can be *Objected* againſt me? ſhall I ſay, that I am ſo made by *Nature*, as to be often *deceived*? No; For I now Know that I cannot be *deceived* in thoſe Things, which I *clearly* Underſtand. Shall I ſay, that at other times I have eſteem'd many Things *True* and *Certain*, which afterwards I found to be *falſities*? No; for I perceived none of thoſe things *clearly* and *diſtinctly*, but being Ignorant of this *Rule* of *Truth*, I took them up for Reaſons, which Reaſons I afterward found to be *Weak*. What then can be ſaid? Shall, I ſay, (as lately I objected) that Perhaps I am *aſleep*, and that what I now think of is no more *True*, then the *Dreams* of People *aſleep*? But this it ſelf *moves* not my Opinion; for certainly tho

I were *asleep*, if any thing appear'd *evident* to my Understanding, 'twould be *True*.

And Thus I Plainly see, that the *Certainty* and *Truth* of all *Science* Depends on the *Knowledge* of the *True God*, so that before I had *Known Him*, I did *Know nothing*; But now many things both of *God* himself, and of other *Intellectual Things*, as also of *Corporeal nature*, which is the *Object* of *Mathematicks*, may be *Plainly Known* and *Certain* to me.

MEDITAT. VI.

Of Corporeal Beings, *and Their* Exiſtence: *As Alſo of the Real Difference, Between* Mind *and* Body.

IT now remains that I examine whether any *Corporeal Beings* do *Exiſt*; And already I know that (as they are the *Object* of *Pure Mathematicks*) they *May* (at leaſt) *Exiſt*, for I *clearly* and *diſtinctly* perceive them; and doubtleſs *God* is *able* to *make*, whatever I am *able* to *perceive*, and I never Judged any thing to be *beyond* his *Power*, but what was *Repugnant* to a *diſtinct perception*. Moreover, ſuch *Material Beings ſeem* to *Exiſt* from the *faculty* of *Imagination*, which I find my ſelf make uſe of, when I am converſant about them: for

if I attentively Consider what *Imagination* is, 'twill appear to be only *a certain Application of our Cognoscitive or knowing Faculty to a Body or Object that is before it*; and if it be *before it*, It must *Exist*.

But that this may be made more *Plain*, I must first examine the *difference* between *Imagination*, and *pure Intellection*, or *Understanding*. So, for example, when I *Imagine* a Triangle, I do not only *Understand* that it is a *figure comprehended* by *three Lines*, but I also *behold* with the *eye* of my *mind* those *three lines* as it were *before Me*, and this is that which I call *imagination*. But if I convert my Thoughts to a *Chiliogone*, or *Figure consisting* of a *Thousand Angles*, I know as well that this Is a *figure comprehended* by a *Thousand sides*, as I know that a *Triangle* is a *Figure Consisting* of *three sides*; but I do not in the same Manner *Imagine*, or *behold* as *present* those *thousand sides*, as I do the *three sides* of a *Triangle*. And tho at the time when I so think of a *Chiliogone*, I may *confusedly* represent to my self some *Figure* (because whenever I Think of a *Corporeal Object*, I am used to *Imagine* some *Shape* or other) yet

yet 'tis evident that this *Repreſentation* is not a *Chiliogone*, becauſe 'tis in nothing *different* from what I ſhould Repreſent to my ſelf if I thought of a *Milion-angled figure*, or any other Figure of *More ſides*; Neither does ſuch a *Confuſed Repreſentation* help me in the leaſt to know thoſe *Properties*, by which a *Chiliogone* differs from other *Polygones* or *Manyangled Figures*. But if a Queſtion be put concerning a *Pentagone*, I know I may *Underſtand its Shape*, as I *Underſtand* the *Shape*, of a *Chiliogone*, without the help of *Imagination*, but I can alſo *imagine* it, by applying the *Eye* of my *Mind* to its *Fives ſides*, and to the *Area* or *ſpace* contained by Them; And herein I manifeſtly perceive that there is required a *peculiar ſort* of *Operation* in the *Mind* to *imagine* a Thing, which I require not to *Underſtand* a Thing; which *New Operation* of the *Mind* plainly ſhews the *difference* between *imagination* and *pure Intellection*.

Beſides this, I Conſider that this *Power* of *Imagination* which is in me (as it differs from the *Power* of *Underſtanding*) does not appertain to the *Eſſence* of *Me*, that is, of *my mind*, for tho I *wanted* it, yet

certainly I ſhould be the *ſame He, that* now *I am*: from whence it ſeems to follow, that it depends on ſomething *different* from *my ſelf*; and I eaſily perceive that if any *Body* whatever did *Exiſt*, to which my *Mind* were ſo *conjoyn'd*, that it may Apply it ſelf when it pleaſed to *Conſider*, or (as it were) *Look* into *this Body*; From hence, I ſay, I perceive *It may ſo be*, that by this very *Body* I may *Imagine Corporeal Beings*: So that this *Manner* of *Thinking* differs from *pure Intellection* only in this, that the *Mind*, when it *Underſtands*, does as it were turn *it ſelf*, to *it ſelf*, or *Reflect* on it ſelf, and *beholds* ſome or other of thoſe *Ideas* which are in it ſelf; But when it *Imagines*, it *Converts* it ſelf upon *Body*, and therein *beholds* ſomething Conformable to that *Idea*, which it hath *underſtood*, or *perceived* by *Senſe*.

But 'tis to remembred, that I ſaid, I eaſily conceive Imagination *May be* ſo performed, ſuppoſing *Body* to *Exiſt*. And becauſe no ſo convenient manner of Explaining it offers it ſelf, from thence I *probably* gueſs, that *Body* does *Exiſt*. But this I only ſay *probably*, for tho I ſhould accurately ſearch into all the Arguments

drawn

drawn from the *distinct Idea* of *Body*, which I find in my *Imagination*, yet I find none of them, from whence I may *necessarily* conclude, *that Body does Exist.*

But I have been accustomed to *Imagine* many other things besides that *Corporeal Nature* which is the *Object* of *pure Mathematicks*; such as are, *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Tasts*, *Pain*, &c. but none of these so *distinctly*. And because I perceive these better by *Sense*, from Which by the Help of the *Memory* they come to the *Imagination*, that I may with the Greater advantage treat of them, I ought at the same time to Consider *Sence*, and to try whether from what I perceive by that way of *Thought*, which I call *Sense*, I can deduce any certain Argument for the *Existence* of *Corporeal Beings*.

And first I will here reflect with my self, what those things were, which being perceived by *Sence* I have heretofore thought *True*, and the *Reasons* why I *so thought*: I will then enquire into the *Reasons* for which I afterwards *doubted* those things. And last of all I will consider what I *ought* to *think* of those Things at *Present*.

First therefore I have always thought

The Reasons why I Trusted my Senses.

that I have had an *Head*, *Hands*, *Feet*, and other *Members*, of which *This Body* (which I have look'd upon as a *Part* of *Me*, or Perhaps as my *Whole self*) Consists; And I have also thought that this *Body* of *Mine* is Conversant or engaged among many *Other Bodies*, by which it is Liable to be *affected* with what is *advantagious* or *hurtful*; What was *Advantagious* I judged by a certain *sense* of *Pleasure*, what was *Hurtful* by a *sense* of *Pain*. Furthermore, besides *Pleasure* and *Pain*, I perceived in my self *Hunger*, *Thirst*, and other such like *Appetites*, as also certain *Corporeal Propensions* to *Mirth*, *Sadness*, *Anger*, and other like *Passions*.

As to What hapned to me from *Bodies without*, Besides the *Extension*, *Figure*, and *Motion* of those *Bodies*, I also perceived in them *Hardness*, *Heat*, and other *tactile Qualities*, as also *Light*, *Colours*, *Smells*, *Tasts*, *Sounds*, &c. and by the *Variation* of these I *distinguish'd* the *Heaven*, *Earth*, and *Seas*, and all other *Bodies* from each other.

Neither was it wholly without Reason (upon the account of these *Ideas* of

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Qualities, which offer'd themſelves to my Thoughts, and which alone I *properly* and *Immediately perceived*) that I thought my ſelf to Perceive ſome Things *Different* from my *Thought*, *viz.* The *Bodies* or *Objects* from whence theſe *Ideas* might *Proceed*; for I often found theſe *Ideas* come upon me without my *Conſent* or *Will*; ſo that I can neither perceive an *Object* (*tho I had a mind to it*) unleſs it were *before* the Organs of my *Senſe*; Neither can I *Hinder* my ſelf from perceiving it, when it is *Preſent*.

And ſeeing that thoſe *Ideas* which I take in by ſenſe are much more *Lively*, *Apparent* and in their kind more *diſtinct*, than any of thoſe which *I knowingly* and *Willingly* frame by Meditation, or ſtir up in my *Memory*; it ſeems to me that they cannot proceed from *my ſelf*. There remains therefore no other way for them to come upon me, but from ſome other Things *Without* Me. Of Which Things ſeeing *I* have no other Knowledge but from theſe *Ideas*, *I* cannot Think but that theſe *Ideas* are *like* the Things.

Moreover, Becauſe *I* remember that *I* firſt made uſe of my *ſenſes* before my *Reaſon*;

ſon; and becauſe *I* did perceive that thoſe *Ideas* which *I* my ſelf did frame were not ſo *Manifeſt* as thoſe which *I* received by my *ſenſes*, but very often *made up of their parts*, *I* was eaſily perſwaded to think that *I* had no *Idea* in my *Underſtanding*, which I had not *Firſt* in my *ſenſe*.

Neither was it without Reaſon that *I* Judged, *That Body* (which by a *peculiar right I* call my *Own*) to be *more nighly* appertaining to Me then any *other Body*. For from It, as from other *Bodies*, *I* can never be *ſeperated*, *I* was *ſenſible* of all *Appetites* and *Affections in It* and *for It*, and laſtly *I* perceived *pleaſure* and *Pain* in its Parts, and not in any other Without it. But why from the *ſenſe* of *Pain* a certain *Grief*, and from the *ſenſe* of *plea ure* a certain *Joy* of the *Mind* ſhould ariſe, or Why that *Gnawing* of the *ſtomach*, Which *I* call *Hunger*, ſhould put me in mind of *Eating*, or the *drineſs* of my *Throat* of *Drinking*, *I* can give no other Reaſon but *that I am taught ſo by Nature*. For to my thinking there is no *Affinity* or *I ikeneſs* between that *Gnawing* of the *Stomach*, and the deſire of *Eating*, or between the *ſenſe* of *Pain*,

Pain, and the *ſorrowful thought* from thence ariſing. But in this as in all other *judgments* that I made of *ſenſible objects*, I ſeem'd to be taught by *Nature*, for I firſt perſwaded my ſelf that things were *ſo* or *ſo*, before ever I enquired into a Reaſon that may prove it.

The Reaſons why I doubt my ſenſes. But afterwards I diſcover'd many experiments, wherein my *ſenſes* ſo groſly deceived me, that I would never truſt them again; for Towers which ſeem'd *Round* a far off, nigh at hand appear'd *ſquare*, and *large* Statues on their tops ſeem'd *ſmall* to thoſe that ſtood on the ground; and in numberleſs other things, I perceived the *judgements* of my *outward ſenſes* were *deceived*: and not of my *outward* only, but of my *inward ſenſes* alſo; for what is more *intimate* or *inward* than *Pain*? And yet I have heard from thoſe, whoſe Arm or Leg was cut off, that they have felt *pain* in that part which they *wanted*, and therefore I am not *abſolutely certain* that any part of me is affected with *pain*, tho I *feel pain* therein. To theſe I have lately added two very *general Reaſons* of *doubt*;

Medit. 1.

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The firſt was, that while I was *awake*, I could not believe my ſelf to perceive any thing, which I could not think my ſelf ſometimes to perceive, tho I were *a ſleep*; And ſeeing I cannot believe, that what I ſeem to perceive in my *ſleep* proceeds from *outward Objects*, what greater Reaſon have I to think ſo of what I perceive whilſt I am *awake*? The other Cauſe of Doubt was, that ſeeing I know not the *Author* of my *Being* (or at leaſt I then *ſuppoſed* my ſelf not to know him) what reaſon is there but that I may be ſo ordered by *Nature* as to be *deceived* even in thoſe things which appear'd to me moſt *true*. And as to the *Reaſons*, which induced me to give *credit* to *ſenſible* Things, 'twas eaſie to return an anſwer thereto, for finding by experience, that I was impelled by *Nature* to many Things, which *Reaſon* diſſwaded me from, I thought I ſhould not far truſt what I was taught by *Nature*. And tho the perceptions of my *ſenſes* depended not on my *Will*, I thought *I* ſhould not therefore conclude, that they proceeded from *Objects different* from my ſelf; for perhaps there may be ſome other *Faculty* in me (tho as yet *unknown*

to

to me) which might frame thoſe *perceptions*.

How far the ſenſes are now to be truſted.

But now that I begin better to know *my ſelf* and the Author of my *Original*, I do not think, that all things, which I ſeem to have from my *ſenſes* are *raſhly* to be *admitted*, neither are all things ſo *had*, to be *doubted*. And firſt becauſe I know that whatever I *clearly* and *diſtinctly* perceive, *may be* ſo made by *God* as I perceive them; the *Power* of *underſtanding clearly* and *diſtinctly* one Thing *without* the other is ſufficient to make Me *certain* that One Thing is *different* from the Other; becauſe it *may* at leaſt be placed apart by *God*, and that it may be eſteem'd *different*, it matters not by what *Power* it *may* be ſo *ſever'd*. And therefore from the knowledge I have, that *I my ſelf exiſt*, and becauſe at the ſame time I underſtand that nothing elſe appertains to my *Nature* or *Eſſence*, but that I am a *thinking Being*, I rightly conclude, that my *Eſſence* conſiſts in this alone, that I am a *thinking Thing*. And tho *perhaps* (or, as I ſhall ſhew preſently, 'tis *certain*) I have a *Body* which is very *nighly* conjoyned to me, yet becauſe

cauſe on this ſide I have a clear and *diſtinct Idea* of my ſelf, as I am only a *thinking Thing*, *not extended*; and on the other ſide becauſe I have a *diſtinct Idea* of my *Body*, as it is onely an *extended* thing, *not thinking*, 'tis from hence *certain*, that I *am really diſtinct from my Body*, and that I can *exiſt without* it.

Moreover I find in my ſelf ſome *Faculties* endow'd with *certain* peculiar waies of *thinking*, ſuch as the *Faculty* of *Imagination*, the *Faculty* of *Perception* or *ſenſe*; without which *I* can conceive my *whole ſelf clearly* and *diſtinctly*, but (changing the phraſe) *I* cannot *conceive* thoſe *Faculties* without *conceiving My ſelf*, that is, an *underſtanding ſubſtance* in which they are; for none of them in their *formal Conception* includes *underſtanding*; from whence *I* perceive they are as *different* from *me*, as the *modus* or *manner* of a Thing is *different* from the *Thing it ſelf*.

I acknowledge alſo, that *I* have ſeveral other *Faculties*, ſuch as *changing* of *place*, *putting on various ſhapes*, &c. Which can no more be underſtood without a *ſubſtance* in which they are, then the foremention'd *Faculties*, and conſequently they

they can no more be underſtood to *Exiſt* without that *ſubſtance*: But yet 'tis Manifeſt, that this ſort of *Faculties*, to the End they may exiſt, ought to be in a *Corporeal, Extended*, and not in an *Underſtanding ſubſtance*, becauſe *Extenſion*, and not *Intellection* or *Underſtanding* is included in the *Clear* and *Diſtinct conception* of them.

But there is alſo in me a certain *Paſſive Faculty* of *ſenſe*, or of *Receiving* and *Knowing* the *Ideas* of *ſenſible Things*; of which *Faculty* I can make no uſe, unleſs there were in my ſelf, or in ſomething elſe, a certain *Active Faculty* of *Producing* and *Effecting* thoſe *Ideas*. But this cannot be in my ſelf, for it Pre-ſuppoſes no *Underſtanding*, and thoſe *Ideas* are Produced in me, tho I help not, and often againſt my *Will*. There remains therefore no Place for this *Active Faculty*, but that it ſhould be in ſome *ſubſtance different* from me. In which becauſe all the *Reallity*, which is contain'd *Objectively* in the *Ideas* Produced by that *Faculty*, ought to be contain'd *Formally* or *Eminently* (as I have Formerly taken notice) this *ſubſtance* muſt be either *a Body* (in which what is in the *Ideas*

Ideas Objectively is contain'd *Formally*) or it Muſt Be *God*, or ſome *Creature* more *excellent* then a *Body* (In which what is in the *Ideas Objectively* is contain'd *Eminently*) But ſeeing that *God* is not a *Deceivour*, 'tis altogether Manifeſt, that *he* does not Place theſe *Ideas* in me either *Immediately* from himſelf, or *Mediately* from any other Creature, wherein their *Objective Reallity* is not * contain'd *Formally*, but only *Eminently*. And ſeeing *God* has given me no *Faculty* to diſcern Whether theſe Ideas proceed from *Corporeal* or *Incorporeal Beings*, but rather a *ſtrong Inclination* to believe that they are ſent from *Corporeal Beings*, there is no Reaſon Why God ſhould not be counted a *Deceiver*, if theſe *Ideas* came from any Where, but from *Corporeal Things*. Therefore we muſt conclude that there are *Corporeal Beings*. Which perhaps are not all the ſame as I comprehend them by *my ſenſe* (for Perception by ſenſe is in many Things very *Obſcure* and *Confuſed*) but thoſe things at leaſt, which I *clearly* and *diſtinctly* Underſtand, that is to ſay, all thoſe things which are comprehended under the *Object* of *Pure Mathematicks*; thoſe things I ſay at leaſt are *True*.

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As to What Remains, They are either ſome *Particulars*, as that the Sun is of ſuch a *Bigneſs* or *Shape*, *&c.* or they are Things leſs *Clearly* Underſtood, as *Light*, *Sound*, *Pain*, &c. And tho theſe and ſuch like Things may be very *Doubtful* and *Uncertain*, yet becauſe *God* is not a *Deceiver*, and becauſe that (Therefore) none of my Opinions can be *falſe* unleſs God has Given me ſome *Faculty* or other to *Correct* my *Error*, hence 'tis that I am incouraged with the Hopes of attaining *Truth* even in theſe very Things.

And certainly it cannot be doubted but whatever *I* am taught by *Nature* has ſomething therein of *Truth*. By *Nature* in General I underſtand either *God* himſelf, or the *Coordination* of Creatures Made by God. By my *Own Nature* in *Particular* I underſtand the *Complexion* or *Aſſociation* of all thoſe things which are given me by God.

Now there is nothing that this *my Nature* teaches me more *expreſly* then that I have a *Body*, Which is not *Well* when I *feel Pain*, that this *Body* wants *Meat* or *Drink*, When I am *Hungry* or *Dry*, *&c.* And therefore I ought not to Doubt but that theſe things are *True*. And by this *ſenſe* of *Pain*, *Hunger*, *Thirſt*, &c. My *Nature* tells

me that *I* am not in my *Body*, as a *Mariner* is in his *Ship*, but that I am moſt *nighly conjoyn'd* thereto, and as it were *Blended therewith*; ſo that *I* with *It* make up *one* thing; For Otherwiſe, when the *Body* were hurt, *I*, who am only a *Thinking Thing*, ſhould not therefore *feel* Pain, but ſhould only *perceive* the Hurt with the *Eye* of my *Underſtanding* (as a *Mariner perceives* by his *ſight* whatever is broken in his Ship) and when the *Body* wants either Meat or Drink, I ſhould only *Underſtand* this want, but ſhould not have the *Confuſed ſenſe* of *Hunger* or *Thirſt*; I call them *Confuſed*, for certainly the *Senſe* of *Thirſt*, *Hunger*, *Pain*, &c. are only *Confuſed Modes* or *Manners* of *Thought* ariſing from the *Union* and (as it were) *mixture* of the *Mind* and *Body*.

I am taught alſo by *Nature*, that there are many other *Bodies Without* and *About* my *Body*, ſome whereof are to be *deſired*, others are to be *Avoided*. And becauſe that I Perceive very Different *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Smells*, *Taſts*, *Heat*, *Hardneſs*, and the Like, from thence I Rightly conclude that there are *Correſpondent Differences* in *Bodies*, from which theſe *different* percep-

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tions of *ſenſe* proceed, tho perhaps not *Alike*. And becauſe that ſome of theſe *perceptions* are *Pleaſant*, others *Unpleaſant*, 'tis evidently *certain*, that my *Body*, or rather my *Whole ſelf* (as *I* am compounded of a *Mind* and *Body*) am liable to be *Affected* by theſe *Bodies* which encompaſs me about.

There are many Other Things Alſo which *Nature* ſeems to teach Me, but *Really* I am not taught by It, but have gotten them by an *ill uſe* of Paſſing my Judgement *Inconſiderately*, and from hence it is that theſe things happen often to be *falſe*; as that all *ſpace* is *Empty*, in which I find *nothing* that *works* upon my *Senſes*; That in a *hot Body* there is ſomething *like* the *Idea* of *Heat* which is in me; That in a *White* or *Green* Body there is the ſame *Whiteneſs* or *Greenneſs* which I *perceive*; And the ſame *Taſte* in a *bitter* or *ſweet* Thing, *&c.* That *Stars*, *Caſtles*, and Other *Remote* Bodies are of the ſame *Bigneſs* and *Shape*, as they are *Repreſented* to my *ſenſes*: and ſuch like. But that I may not admit of any Thing in this very matter, which I cannot *Diſtinctly* perceive, it behoves me here to determine more *Accurately* What I mean when I ſay, *That I am taught a Thing by Nature.*

Here I take *Nature* more *ſtrictly*, then for the *Complication* of all thoſe Things which are Given me by *God*; For in this *Complication* there are many things contain'd which relate to the *Mind alone*, as, That I perceive What is *done* cannot be *not Done*, and all Other things which are known by the *Light* of *Nature*, but of theſe I ſpeak not at preſent. There are alſo many Other Things which belong *only* to the *Body*, as, That it *tends Downwards* and ſuch like, of theſe alſo I treat not at Preſent. But I ſpeak of thoſe Things only which *God* hath beſtowed upon me as I am *Compounded* of a *Mind* and *Body together*, and not *differently Conſider'd*. 'Tis *Nature* therefore thus taken that teaches me to *avoid troubleſome Objects*, and *ſeek* after *pleaſing Ones*; but it appears not that this *Nature* teaches us to conclude any thing of theſe Perceptions of our *ſenſes*, before that we make by our *Underſtanding* a diligent examination of *outward Objects*; for to Enquire into the *Truth* of Things belongs not to the *Whole Compoſitum* of a Man as he Conſiſts of *Mind* and *Body*, but to the *Mind alone*.

So that tho a *ſtar affect* my eye no *more* then

then a *ſmall ſpark* of Fire, yet there is in my Eye no *Real* or *Poſitive Inclination* to *believe* One no bigger then the Other, but thus I have been uſed to Judge from my Childhood without any Reaſon: and tho coming nigh the Fire I feel Heat, and Coming too nigh I feel Pain, yet there is no Reaſon to perſwade me, That in the Fire there is any thing *like* either that Heat or that Pain, but only that there is ſomething therein, Whatever it be, that excites in us thoſe *ſenſations* of Heat or Pain: and ſo tho in ſome ſpace there may be nothing that Works on my *ſenſes*, it does not from thence follow, that there is no *Body* there; for I ſee that in theſe and many other things I am uſed to overturn the Order of Nature, becauſe I uſe theſe *perceptions* of *ſenſe* (which properly are given me by Nature to make known to the mind what is *advantagious* or *hurtful* to the *Compoſitum*, whereof the *mind* is part, and *ſo far* only they are *Clear* and *Diſtinct* enough) as *certain Rules* immediately to diſcover the *Eſſence* of *External Bodies*, of Which they make known nothing but very *Obſcurely* and *Confuſedly*.

I have * formerly ſhewn how my *Judgment* happens to be *falſe* notwithſtanding *Gods Goodneſs*. But now there ariſes a new *Difficulty* concerning thoſe very things which *Nature* tells me I am to *proſecute* or *avoid*, and concerning my *Internal ſenſes*, Wherein I find many *Errors*, as when a Man being deceived by the Pleaſant Taſte of ſome ſort of Meat, devours therein ſome hidden Poyſon. But in this very Inſtance it cannot be ſaid, that the Man is impelled by Nature to deſire the *Poyſon*, for of that he is wholly Ignorant; but he is ſaid to Deſire the *Meat* only as being of a grateful Taſte; and from hence nothing can be concluded but, That *Mans-Nature* is not *All-knowing*; which is no Wonder ſeeing Man is a *Finite Being*, and therefore nothing but *Finite Perfections* belong to him. *Medit.* 4.

But We often err even in thoſe things to Which we are *Impelled* by *Nature*, as when ſick men deſire that *Meat* or *Drink*, which will certainly prove Hurtful to them. To this it may perhaps be reply'd, That they *Err* in this becauſe their *Nature* is *Corrupt*. But this Anſwers not the Difficulty,

ficulty, For a ſick man is no leſs *Gods Creature* then a Man in Health, and therefore 'tis as Abſurd to Imagine a *Deceitful Nature* impoſed by *God* on the One as on the Other; And as a Clock that is made up of Wheels and Weights does no leſs ſtrictly obſerve the *Laws* of its *Nature*, when it is *ill* contrived, and tells the hours *falſly*, as when it anſwers the Deſire of the Artificer in all performances; ſo if I conſider the body of a Man as a meer *Machine* or *Movement*, made up and compounded of *Bones*, *Nerves*, *Muſcles*, *Veins*, *Blood*, and *Skin*; ſo that, tho there were no *mind* in It, yet It would perform all thoſe Motions which now are in it (thoſe only excepted which Proceed from the *Will*, and conſequently from the *Mind*) I do eaſily acknowledge, that it would be as *natural* for him (if for example ſake he were ſick of a *Dropſie*) to ſuffer that *Drineſs* of his *Throat* which uſes to bring into his mind the *ſenſe* of *Thirſt*, & that thereby his Nerves and other Parts would be ſo diſpoſed as to take Drink, by Which his diſeaſe would be encreaſed; As (ſuppoſing him to be troubled with no ſuch Diſtemper) by the like Drineſs of Throat he would be diſ-

poſed to Drink, when 'tis Requiſite. And tho, if I reſpect the Intended uſe of a Clock I may ſay that it *Errs* from its *Nature*, when it tells the Hours *wrong*, and ſo conſidering the *Movement* of a *Mans Body* as contrived for ſuch *Motions* as are uſed to be performed thereby, I may think That alſo to *Err* from its *Nature*, if its *Throat* is *Dry*, when it has no want of Drink for its *Preſervation*. Yet I Plainly diſcover, that this laſt *Acceptation* of *Nature* differs much from that whereof we have been ſpeaking all this While, for this is only a *Denomination extrinſick* to the Things whereof 'tis ſpoken, and *depending* on my *Thought*, while it *Compares* a *ſick* man, and a *diſorderly* Clock with the *Idea* of an *healthy* man and a *Rectified* Clock. But by *Nature* in its former *Acceptation* I Underſtand ſomething that is *Really* in the *Things* themſelves, which therefore has ſomething of *Truth* in it.

But tho Reſpecting only a *Body ſick* of a Dropſie it be an *Extrinſick Denomination* to ſay, that its *Nature* is *Corrupt*, becauſe it has a *Dry Throat*, and ſtands in *no need* of Drink; yet reſpecting the *Whole Compound* or *Mind joyn'd* to ſuch a *Body*, 'tis not

not a *meer Denomination*, but a *real Error* of *Nature* for it to *thirſt* when *drink* is *hurtful* to it. It remains therefore here to be inquired, how the *Goodneſs* of *God* ſuffers *Nature ſo taken* to be *deceivable*.

Firſt therefore I underſtand that a *chief difference* between my *Mind* and *Body* conſiſts in this, That my *Body* is of its *Nature diviſible*, but my *Mind indiviſible*; for while I conſider my *Mind* or *my ſelf*, as I am only a *thinking Thing*, I can diſtinguiſh *no parts* in Me, but I perceive my ſelf to be but *one entire* Thing; and tho the *whole Mind* ſeems to be *united* to the *whole Body*, yet a Foot, an Arm, or any other part of the Body being cut off, I do not therefore conceive any *part* of my *Mind* taken away; Neither can its *Faculties* of *deſiring*, *perceiving*, *underſtanding*, &c. be called its *Parts*, for tis one and the *ſame*, *mind*, that *deſires*, that *perceives*, that *underſtands*; Contrarily, I cannot think of any *Corporeal* or *extended Being*, which I cannot eaſily *divide* into *Parts* by my thought, and by this I underſtand it to be *diviſible*. And this alone (if I had known it from no other Argument) is ſufficient to inform

form me, that my *mind* is *really diſtinct* from my *Body*.

Nextly I find, that my *mind* is not *immediately affected* by all parts of my *body*, but only by the *Brain*, and perhaps only by one ſmall part of it, That, to wit, wherein the *common ſenſe* is ſaid to reſide; Which part, as often as it is diſpoſed in the *ſame manner*, will repreſent to the *mind* the *ſame thing*, tho at the ſame time the other parts of the *body* may be *differently* order'd. And this is proved by numberleſs Experiments, which need not here be related.

Moreover I diſcover that the *nature* of my *body* is ſuch, that no part of it can be *moved* by an other *remote* part thereof, but it may alſo be *moved* in the *ſame manner* by ſome of the *interjacent* parts, tho the more *remote* part lay ſtill and acted not; As for example in the Rope,

A——B——C——D

if its end D. were drawn, the end A. would be moved no otherwiſe, than if one of the intermediate parts B. or C. were drawn, and the end D. reſt quiet. So when I feel *pain* in my *Foot*, the conſideration of Phyſicks inſtructs me, that this

this is performed by the help of *Nerves* diſperſed through the Foot, which from thence being *continued* like Ropes to the very Brain, whilſt they are *drawn* in the Foot, they alſo *draw* the inward parts of the Brain to which they reach, and therein excite a certain *motion*, which is ordain'd by *Nature* to affect the *mind* with a *ſenſe* of *Pain*, as being in the *Foot*. But becauſe theſe Nerves muſt paſs through the *Shin*, the *Thighs*, the *Loins*, the *Back*, the *Neck*, before they can reach the *Brain* from the *Foot*, it may ſo happen, that tho *that part* of them, which is in the Foot were not touch'd, but only ſome of their *intermediate parts*, yet the ſame *motion*, would be cauſed in the *Brain*, as when the *Foot* it ſelf is *ill affected*, from whence 'twil neceſſarily follow, that the *mind* ſhould *perceive* the ſame *Pain*. And thus may we think of any other *Senſe*.

I underſtand laſtly, that ſeeing each ſingle motion perform'd in that part of the *Brain*, which *immediately affects* the *mind*, excites therein only one ſort of *ſenſe*, nothing could be contrived more conveniently in this caſe, than that, of all thoſe *Senſes* which it can cauſe, it

ſhould

ſhould cauſe that which *cheifly*, and moſt *frequently* conduces to the *conſervation* of an *healthful Man*; And experience witneſſes, that to this very *end* all our *ſenſes* are given us by *Nature*; and therefore nothing can be found therein, which does not abundantly teſtifie the *Power* and *Goodneſs* of *God*. Thus for Example, when the Nerves of the Feet are violently and more than ordinarily moved, that motion of them being propagated through the *Medulla Spinalis* of the Back to the inward parts of the Brain, there it ſignifies to the mind, that ſomething or other is to be felt, and what is this but Pain, as if it were in the Foot, by which the Mind is excited to uſe its indeavours for removing the Cauſe, as being hurtful to the Foot. But the *Nature* of *Man* might have been ſo *order'd* by *God*, that That ſame motion in the Brain ſhould repreſent to the mind any other thing, *viz.* either it ſelf as 'tis in the Brain, or it ſelf as it is in the Foot, or in any of the other forementioned intermediate parts, or laſtly any other thing whatſoever; but none of theſe would have ſo much conduced to the *Conſervation* of the *Body*.

In

In the like manner when we want drink, from thence ariſes a certain *dryneſs* in the *Throat*, which moves the Nerves thereof, and by their means the inward parts of the Brain, and this motion *affects* the *mind* with the *ſenſe* of *thirſt*; becauſe that in this caſe nothing is more requiſite for us to know, then that we *want drink* for the *Preſervation* of our *Health*. So of the Reſt.

From all which 'tis manifeſt, that (notwithſtanding the *infinite Goodneſs* of God) 'tis impoſſible but the *Nature* of *Man* as he conſiſts of a *mind* and *body* ſhould be *deceivable*. For if any cauſe ſhould excite (not in the Foot but) in the Brain it ſelf, or in any other part through which the Nerves are continued from the Foot to the Brain, that *ſelf ſame* motion, which uſes to ariſe from the Foot being troubled, the *Pain* would be felt *as in the Foot*, and the *ſenſe* would be *naturally* deceived; for 'tis conſonant to Reaſon (ſeeing that That ſame motion of the Brain alwayes repreſents to the mind that ſame ſenſe, and it oftner proceeds from a cauſe *hurtful* to the *Foot*, than from any other) I ſay 'tis reaſonable, that it ſhould make known

known to the *mind* the Pain of the *Foot*, rather than of any other *part*. And ſo if a *dryneſs* of *Throat* ariſes (not as 'tis uſed from the *neceſſity* of *drink* for the *conſervation* of the *Body*, but) from an *unuſual Cauſe*, as it happens in a *Dropſie*, 'tis far better that it ſhould *then deceive us*; then that it ſhould *alwayes deceive* us when the *Body* is in *Health*, and ſo of the Reſt.

And this conſideration helps me very much, not only to *underſtand* the *Errors* to which my *Nature* is ſubject, but alſo to *correct* and *avoid* them. For ſeeing I know that all my *Senſes* do oftener inform me *falſly* than *truely* in thoſe things which conduce to the *Bodies advantage*; and ſeeing I can uſe (almoſt alwayes) more of them than one to *Examine* the ſame thing, as alſo I can uſe *memory*, which joyns preſent and paſt things together, and my *underſtanding* alſo, which hath already diſcovered to me all the *cauſes* of my *Errors*, I ought no longer to fear, that what my *Senſes* daily repreſent to me ſhould be falſe. But eſpecially thoſe *extravagant Doubts* of my Firſt Meditation are to be turn'd off as ridiculous; and per-

perticularly the *chief* of them, *viz.* That * of not *diſtinguiſhing Sleep* from *Waking*, for now I plainly diſcover a great *difference*, between them, for my *Dreams* are never *conjoyned* by my *memory* with the other *actions* of *my life*, as whatever happens to me *awake* is; and certainly if (while I were awake) any perſon ſhould ſuddenly appear to me, and preſently diſappear (as in *Dreams*) ſo that I could not tell *from whence* he came or *where* he went, I ſhould rather eſteem it a *Spectre* or *Apparition feign'd* in my Brain, then a *true Man*; but when ſuch things occur, as I diſtinctly know from *whence*, *where*, and *when* they come, and I *conjoyn* the *perception* of them by my *memory* with the other *Accidents* of my *life*, I am *certain* they are repreſented to me *waking* and not *aſleep*, neither ought I in the leaſt to doubt of their *Truth*, if after I have called up all my *ſenſes*, *memory*, and *underſtanding* to their *Examination* I find nothing in any of them, that claſhes with other truths; For *God* not being a *Deceiver*, it follows, that In ſuch things I am not *deceived*. But becauſe the *urgency* of *Action* in the common *occurrences* of *Affairs* will

will not alwayes allow time for ſuch an *accurate examination*, I muſt confeſs that *Mans life* is *ſubject* to many *Errors* about *perticulars*, ſo that the *infirmity* of our *Nature* muſt be *acknowledged* by Us.

FINIS.

ADVRTISEMENET

CONCERNING THE

OBJECTIONS.

AMong ſeven Parcels of Objections made by Divers Learned Perſons againſt theſe Meditations, I have made choiſe of the Third in the Latine Copy, as being *Penn'd* by *Thomas Hobbs* of *Malmesbury*, a Man famouſly known to the World abroad, but eſpecially to his own the Engliſh Nation; and therefore 'tis likely that what comes from Him may be more acceptable to his Countrymen, then what proceeds from a Stranger; and as the ſtrength of a Fortification is never better known then by a Forcible Reſiſtance, ſo fares

it with these *Meditations* which stand unshaken by the Violent Opposition of so *Potent* an Enemy. And yet it must be Confess'd that the Force of these Objections and Cogency of the Arguments cannot be well apprehended by those, who are not versed in other *Pieces* of Mr. *Hobbs*'s Philosophy, especially His Book *De Corpore* and *De Homine*, The former whereof I am sure is Translated into English, and therefore not Impertinently refer'd to Here in a Discourse to English Readers. And this is the *Reason* that makes the Great *Des-Cartes* pass over many of these Objections so slightly, VVho certainly would have Undermined the whole Fabrick of the *Hobbian Philosophy* had he but known upon VVhat Foundations it was Built.

O B-

OBJECTIONS

Made againſt the Foregoing

MEDITATIONS,

BY THE FAMOUS

THOMAS HOBBS

Of MALMESBURY,

WITH

DES-CARTES'S

ANSWERS.

OBJECT. I.

Againſt the Firſt Meditation: Of things Doubtful.

'TIS evident enough from What has been ſaid in this Meditation, that there is no *ſign* by Which we may Diſtinguiſh our *Dreams* from *True Senſe*

Senſe and *Waking*, and therefore that thoſe *Phantaſmes* which we have waking and from our Senſes are not accidents inhering in Outward Objects, neither do they Prove that ſuch outward Objects do Exiſt; and therefore if we truſt our Senſes without any other Ground, we may well doubt whether any Thing *Be* or *Not*. We therefore acknowledge the Truth of this Meditation. But Becauſe *Plato* and other Antient Philoſophers argued for the ſame *incertainty* in ſenſible Things, and becauſe 'tis commonly Obſerved by the Vulgar that 'tis hard to Diſtinguiſh Sleep from Waking, I would not haye the moſt excellent Author of ſuch new Thoughts put forth ſo antique Notions.

ANSWER.

Thoſe Reaſons of Doubt which by this Philoſopher are admitted as *true*, were propoſed by Me only as *Probable*, and I made uſe of them not that I may vend them as *new*, but partly that I may prepare the Minds of my Readers for the Conſideration of Intellectual Things, wherein they ſeem'd to me very neceſſary; And partly that thereby I may ſhew how

how firm thoſe Truths are, which hereafter I lay down, ſeeing they cannot be Weaken'd by theſe Metaphyſical Doubts: So that I never deſigned to gain any Honor by repeating them, but I think I could no more omit them, then a Writer in Phyſick can paſs over the Deſcription of a Diſeaſe, Whoſe Cure he intends to Teach.

OBJECT. II.

Againſt the Second Meditation: Of the Nature of Mans Mind.

I *Am a Thinking Thing.* 'Tis True; for becauſe I *think* or have a *Phantaſme* (whether I am *awake* or *aſleep*) it follows that *I am Thinking*, for *I Think* and *I am Thinking* ſignifie the ſame Thing. Becauſe *I Think*, it follows That *I am*, for whatever *Thinks* cannot be *Nothing*. But when he Adds, *That is, a Mind, a Soul, an Underſtanding, Reaſon*, I queſtion his Argumentation; for it does not ſeem a Right Conſequence to ſay, *I am a Thinking Thing*, therefore *I am a Thought*, neither, *I am an Underſtanding Thing*, therefore *I am the Underſtanding*. For in the ſame manner

I may Conclude, *I am a Walking Thing*, therefore *I am the Walking it ſelf.*

Wherefore *D. Cartes* Concludes that an *Underſtanding Thing* and *Intellection* (which is the *Act* of an Underſtanding Thing) are the ſame; or at leaſt that an *Underſtanding Thing* and the *Intellect* (which is the *Power* of an Underſtanding Thing) are the ſame; And yet all Philoſophers diſtinguiſh the *ſubject* from its *Faculties* and *Acts*, that is, from its *Properties* and *Eſſence*, for the *Thing it ſelf* is one thing, and its *Eſſence* is an other. It may be therefore that a *Thinking Thing* is the *Subject* of a *Mind*, *Reaſon*, or *Underſtanding*, and therefore it may be a *Corporeal Thing*, the Contrary Whereof is here *Aſſumed* and not *Proved*; and yet this *Inference* is the *Foundation* of that Concluſion which *D. Cartes* would Eſtabliſh.

In the ſame Meditation, * *I know that I am, I ask What I am Whom I Thus know, Certainly the Knowledge of Me preciſely ſo taken depends not on thoſe Things of whoſe Exiſtence I am yet Ignorant.* 'Tis Certain the Knowledge of this Pro-

* *Places noted with this Aſterick are the Paſſages of the foregoing Meditations here Objected againſt.*

Propoſition *I am*, depends on this, *I think*, as he hath rightly inform'd us; but from whence have we the knowledge of this Propoſition, *I think*? certainly from hence only, that we cannot conceive any *Act* without its *ſubject*, as *dancing* without a *Dancer*, *knowledge*, without a *Knower*, *thought* without a *thinker*.

And from hence it ſeems to follow, that a *thinking Thing* is a *Corporeal Thing*; for the *Subjects* of all *Acts* are underſtood only in a *Corporeal way*, or after the manner of *matter*, as he himſelf ſhews hereafter by the example of a peice of Wax, which changing its *colour*, *conſiſtence*, *ſhape*, and other *Acts* is yet known to continue the *ſame thing*, that is, the *ſame matter ſubject* to ſo many *changes*. But I cannot conclude from another *thought* that *I now think*; for tho a Man may *think* that he *hath thought* (which conſiſts only in *memory*) yet 'tis altogether impoſſible for him to *think* that he *now thinks*, or to *know*, that *he knows*, for the queſtion may be put *infinitely*, how do you *know* that you *know*, that you *know*, that you *know*? &c.

Wherefore ſeeing the Knowledge of this Propoſition *I am*, depends on the

knowledge of this *I think*, and the knowledge of this is from hence only, that we cannot ſeparate *thought* from *thinking matter*, it ſeems rather to follow, that a *thinking thing* is *material*, than that 'tis *immaterial*.

ANSWER.

When I ſaid, *That is a Mind, a Soul, an Underſtanding, Reaſon*, &c. I did not mean by theſe *names* the *Faculties* only, but the *things* indow'd with thoſe *Faculties*; and ſo 'tis alwayes underſtood by the two firſt names (*mind* and *ſoul*) and very often ſo underſtood by the two laſt Names (*underſtanding* and *Reaſon*) and this I have explain'd ſo often, and in ſo many places of theſe Meditations, that there is not the leaſt occaſion of queſtioning my meaning.

Neither is there any parity between *Walking* and *Thought*, for *walking* is uſed only for the *Act* it ſelf, but *thought* is ſometimes uſed for the *Act*, ſometimes for the *Faculty*, and ſometimes for the *thing* it ſelf, wherein the *Faculty* reſides.

Neither do I ſay, that the *underſtanding*

ding thing and *intellection* are the ſame, or that the *underſtanding thing* and the *intellect* are the ſame, if the *intellect* be taken for the *Faculty*, but only when 'tis taken for the *thing it ſelf that underſtands*. Yet I willingly confeſs, that I have (as much as in me lay) made uſe of *abſtracted words* to ſignifie that *thing* or *ſubſtance*, which I would have deveſted of all thoſe things that belong not to it. Whereas contrarily this Philoſopher uſes the moſt *concrete Words* to ſignifie this *thinking thing*, ſuch as *ſubject*, *matter*, *Body*, &c. that he may not ſuffer it to be ſeparated from *Body*.

Neither am I concern'd that His manner of joyning many things together may ſeem to ſome fitter for the diſcovery of Truth, than mine, wherein I ſeparate as much as poſſibly each particular. But let us omit words and ſpeak of things.

It may be (ſayes he) *that a Thinking thing is a corporeal thing, the contrary whereof is here aſſumed and not proved.* But herein he is miſtaken, for I never *aſſumed* the *contrary*, neither have I uſed it as a *Foundation*, for the reſt of *my Superſtructure*, but left it wholly *undetermin'd* till the *ſixth*

Medita-

Meditation, and in that 'tis proved.

Then he tells us rightly, *that we cannot conceive any Act without its ſubject*, as *thought* without a *thinking thing*, for what *thinks* cannot be *nothing*; but then he ſubjoyns without any Reaſon, and againſt the uſual manner of ſpeaking, and contrary to all Logick, *that hence it ſeem to follow, that a thinking thing is a corporeal Being.* Truly the *ſubjects* of all *Acts* are underſtood under the notion of *ſubſtance*, or if you pleaſe under the notion of *matter* (that is to ſay of *metaphyſical matter*) but not therefore under the notion of *Bodies.*

But Logicians and Commonly all Men are uſed to ſay, that there are ſome *Spiritual*, ſome *Corporeal* ſubſtances. And by the Inſtance of Wax I only proved that *Colour*, *Conſiſtence*, *Shape*, &c. appertain not to the *Ratio Formalis* of the Wax; For in that Place I treated neither of the *Ratio Formalis* of the *Mind*, neither of *Body.*

Neither is it pertinent to the buſineſs, that the Philoſopher aſſerts, *That one Thought cannot be the ſubject of an other thought*, for Who beſides Himſelf ever Imagin'd This? But that I may explain the mat-

matter in a few words, 'Tis certain that *Thought* cannot be without a *Thinking Thing*, neither any *Act* or any *Accident* without a *ſubſtance* wherein it reſides. But ſeeing that we know not a *ſubſtance immediately by it ſelf*, but by this alone, that 'tis the *ſubject* of ſeveral *Acts*, it is very conſonant to the commands of Reaſon and Cuſtome, that we ſhould call by *different names* thoſe *ſubſtances*, which we perceive are the *ſubjects* of very *different Acts* or *Accidents*, and that afterwards we ſhould examine, whether thoſe *different names* ſignifie *different* or *one* and the *ſame* thing. Now there are ſome *Acts* which we call *corporeal*, as *magnitude*, *figure*, *motion*, and what ever elſe cannot be thought on without *local extenſion*, and the *ſubſtance* wherein theſe reſide we call *Body*; neither can it be imagin'd that 'tis one *ſubſtance* which is the *ſubject* of *Figure*, and another *ſubſtance* which is the *ſubject* of *local motion*, &c. Becauſe all theſe *Acts* agree under one common notion of *Extenſion*. Beſides there are other *Acts*, which we call *cogitative* or *thinking*, as *underſtanding*, *will*, *imagination*, *ſenſe*, &c. All which agree under the common noti-

on

on of *thought*, *perception*, or *Conſcience*; And the *ſubſtance* wherein they are, we ſay, is a *thinking thing*, or *mind*, or call it by whatever other name we pleaſe, ſo we do not confound it with *corporeal ſubſtance*, becauſe *cogitative Acts* no have affinity with *corporeal Acts*, and *thought*, which is the common *Ratio* of *thoſe* is wholly diffrent from *Extenſion*, which is the common *Ratio* of *Theſe*. But after we have formed two *diſtinct conceptions* of theſe two *ſubſtances*, from what is ſaid in the ſixth Meditation, 'tis eaſie to know, whether they be *one* and the *ſame* or *different*.

OBJECT. III.

* *WHich of them is it, that is diſtinct from my thought? which of them is it that can be ſeparated from me?*

Some perhaps will anſwer this Queſtion thus, I my ſelf, who *think* am diſtinct from my *thought*, and my *thought* is *different* from me (tho not *ſeperated*) as *dancing* is *diſtinguiſhed* from the *Dancer* (as before is noted.) But if *Des Cartes* will

will prove, that *he* who *understands* is the same with his *understanding*, we shall fall into the Scholastick expressions, the *understanding understands*, the *sight sees*, the *Will wills*, and then by an exact analogy, the Walking (or at least the *Faculty* of walking) shall walk. All which are obscure, improper, and unworthy that perspicuity which is usual with the noble *Des Cartes*.

ANSWER.

I do not deny, that *I* who *think* am *distinct* from my *thought*, as a *thing* is *distinguish'd* from its *modus* or *manner*; But when I ask, *which of them is it that is distinct from my thought*? this I understand of those various *modes* of *thought* there mention'd, and not of my *substance*; and when I subjoyn, *which of them is it that can be separated from me*? I only signifie that all those *modes* or *manners* of *thinking* reside in me, neither do I herein perceive what occasion of *doubt* or *obscurity* can be imagined.

OB-

OBJECT. IV.

**IT remains therefore for me to Confeſs that I cannot Imagine what this Wax is, but that I conceive in my mind What it is.*

There is a great Difference between *Imagination* (that is) having an *Idea* of a Thing, and the *Conception of the Mind* (that is) a *Concluding* from *Reaſoning* that a thing *Is* or *Exiſts*. But *Des-Cartes* has not Declared to us in what they Differ. Beſides, the Antient Ariſtotelians have clearly deliver'd as a Doctrine, that *ſubſtance* is not *perceived* by *ſenſe*, but is *Collected* by *Ratiocination*.

+ But what ſhall we now ſay, if perhaps *Ratiocination* be nothing Elſe but a *Copulation* or *Concatenation* of *Names* or *Appellations* by this Word *Is*? From whence 'twill follow that we *Collect* by *Reaſoning* nothing *of* or *concerning* the *Nature* of *Things*, but of the *names* of *Things*, that is to ſay, we only diſcover whether or no we *joyn* the *Names* of *Things* according to the *Agreements* which at Pleaſure we have made concerning their *ſignifications*; if it be ſo (as ſo it may be) *Ratiocination* will de-

depend on *Words*, *Words* on *Imagination*, and perhaps *Imagination* as alſo *Senſe* on the *Motion* of *Corporeal Parts*; and ſo the *Mind* ſhall be nothing but *Motions* in ſome Parts of an *Organical Body*.

ANSWER.

I have here Explain'd the Difference between *Imagination*, and the Meer *Conception* of the *Mind*, by reckoning up in my Example of the Wax, what it is therein which we *Imagine*, and what it is that we *conceive* in our *Mind* only: but beſides this, I have explained in an other Place How we *underſtand* one way, and *Imagine* an other way One and the ſame Thing, ſuppoſe a Pentagone or Five ſided Figure.

There is in *Ratiocination* a *Conjunction* not of *Words*, but of *Things ſignified* by *Words*; And I much admire that the *Contrary* could Poſſibly enter any Mans Thoughts; For Who ever doubted but that a *Frenchman* and a *German* may argue about the *ſame Things*, tho they uſe very *Differing Words*? and does not the Philoſopher Diſprove himſelf when he ſpeaks of

of the *Agreements which at pleaſure we have made about the ſignifications of Words*? for if he grants that *ſomething* is *Signified* by *Words*, Why will he not admit that our Ratiocinations are rather about this *ſomething*, then about *Words* only? and by the ſame Right that he concludes the *Mind* to be a *Motion*, he may Conclude Alſo that the Earth is Heaven, or What elſe he Pleaſes.

OBJECT. V.

Againſt the Third Meditation *of God.*

*SOme *of Theſe* (*viz.* Humane Thoughts) *are as it were the Images of Things, and to theſe alone belongs properly the Name of an Idea, as when I Think on a* Man, *a Chimera, Heaven, an Angel, or God.*

When I Think on a *Man*, I perceive an *Idea* made up of *Figure* and *Colour*, whereof I may *doubt* whether it be the *Likeneſs* of a *Man* or not; and ſo when I think on *Heaven*. But when I think on a Chimera, I perceive an *Image* or *Idea*, of which I may *doubt* whether it be the *Likeneſs* of any *Animal* not only at preſent Exiſting, but

but poſſible to Exiſt, or that ever will Exiſt hereafter or not.

But thinking on an *Angel*, there is offer'd to my Mind ſometimes the *Image* of a *Flame*, ſometimes the *Image* of a *Pretty Little Boy* with *Wings*, which I am certain has no *Likeneſs* to an *Angel*, and therefore that it is not the *Idea* of an *Angel*; But beleiving that there are ſome Creatures, Who do (as it were) wait upon God, and are Inviſible, and Immaterial, upon the *Thing Believed* or *ſuppoſed* we Impoſe the *Name* of *Angel*; Whereas the *Idea*, under which I Imagine an Angel, is compounded of the Ideas of ſenſible Things.

In the like manner at the Venerable Name of *God*, we have *no Image* or *Idea* of God, and therefore we are forbidden to *Worſhip God* under any *Image*, leaſt we ſhould ſeem to *Conceive* Him that is inconceivable.

Whereby it appears that we have no *Idea* of *God*; but like one *born blind*, who being brought to the *Fire*, and perceiving himſelf to be *Warmed*, knows there is *ſomething* by which he is *warmed* and Hearing it called *Fire*, he Concludes that *Fire Exiſts*, but yet knows not of what *ſhape* or *Co-*

lour the Fire is, neither has he any *Image* or *Idea* thereof in his *Mind.*

So Man knowing that there muſt be ſome *Cauſe* of his *Imaginations* or *Ideas*, as alſo an other *cauſe before That*, and ſo *onwards*, he is brought at laſt to an *End*, or to a *ſuppoſal* of ſome *Eternal Cauſe*, Which becauſe it never *began* to *Be* cannot have any other *Cauſe before it*, and thence he Concludes that 'tis *neceſſary* that ſome *Eternal Thing Exiſt*: and yet he has no *Idea* which He can call the *Idea* of this *Eternal Thing*, but he names this *Thing*, which he believes and acknowledges by the Name *God.*

But now *Des-Cartes* proceeds from this Poſition, *That we have an Idea of God in our Mind*, to prove this Theoreme, *That God (that is an Almighty, Wiſe, Creatour of the World) Exiſts*, whereas he ought to have explain'd this *Idea* of *God* better, and he ſhould have thence deduced not only his *Exiſtence*, but alſo the *Creation* of the World.

ANSWER.

Here the Philoſopher will have the Word *Idea* be only Underſtood for the

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Images of *Material* Things repreſented in a *Corporeal* Phantaſie, by which Poſition he may Eaſily Prove, that there can be no Proper *Idea* of an *Angel* or *God*. Whereas I declare every Where, but eſpecially in this Place, that I take the Name *Idea* for whatever is immediately *perceived* by the *Mind*, ſo that when I *Will*, or *Fear*, becauſe at the ſame time *I perceive* that I *Will* or *Fear*, this very *Will* or *Fear* are reckon'd by me among the number of *Ideas*; And I have purpoſely made uſe of that Word, becauſe It was uſual with the Antient Philoſophers to ſignifie the Manner of *Perceptions* in the *Divine Mind*, altho neither we nor they acknowledge a Phantaſie in *God*: and beſides I had no fitter Word to expreſs it by.

And I think I have ſufficiently explain'd the *Idea* of *God* for thoſe that will attend my meaning, but I can never do it fully enough for thoſe that will Underſtand my Words otherwiſe then I intend them.

Laſtly, what is here added concerning the *Creation* of the World is wholly beſide the Queſtion in hand.

OBJECT. VI.

*But *there are Other* (Thoughts) *That have Superadded Forms to them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny; I know I have alwayes (whenever I think) ſome certain thing as the Subject or Object of my Thought, but in this laſt ſort of Thoughts there is ſomething More which I think upon then Barely the Likeneſs of the Thing; and of theſe Thoughts ſome are called Wills and Affections, and others of them Judgements.*

When any one *Fears* or *Wills*, he has certainly the *Image* of the *Thing Fear'd*, or *Action Will'd*, but what more a *Willing* or *Fearing* Man has in his Thoughts is not explain'd; and tho *Fear* be a *Thought*, yet I ſee not how it can be any other then the *Thought* of the *Thing Fear'd*; For what is the *Fear* of a *Lion ruſhing on me*, but the *Idea* of a Lion Ruſhing on me, and the *Effect* (which that *Idea* produces in the *Heart*) whereby the Man *Fearing* is excited to that Animal Motion which is called Flight? but now this Motion of

Fly-

Flying is not *Thought*, it remains therefore that in *Fear* there is no other *Thought*, but that which consists in the *likeness* of the thing. And the same may be said of *Will*.

Moreover *Affirmation* and *Negation* are not without a *voice* and *words*, and hence 'tis that Brutes can neither *affirme* or *deny* not so much as in their Thought, and consequently neither can they judge. But yet the same thought may be in a beast as in a Man; for when we *affirme* that a Man runs, we have not a *thought* different from what a Dog has when he sees his Master running; *Affirmation* therefore or *Negation* superadds nothing to *meer thoughts*, unless perhaps it adds this thought, that the *names* of which an *Affirmation* consists are (to the Person *affirming*) the *Names* of the *same thing*; and this is not to comprehend in the *thought* more then the *likeness* of the *thing*, but it is only comprehending the same *likeness twice*.

ANSWER.

Tis self evident, That 'tis one thing to *see* a Lion and at the same time to *fear* him,

and an other thing *only* to *see* him. So 'tis one thing to *see* a Man Running, and an other thing to *Affirme* within my self (which may be done without a voice) That I *see* him.

But in all this objection I find nothing that requires an Answer.

OBJECT. VII.

**NOw it remains for me to examine, how I have received this Idea of God, for I have neither received it by means of my senses, neither comes it to me without my forethought, as the Ideas of sensible things use to do, when those things work on the Organs of my sense, or at least seem so to work; Neither is this Idea framed by my self, for I can neither add to, nor detract from it. Wherefore I have only to conclude, that it is innate, even as the Idea of me my self is Natural to my self.*

If there be no *Idea* of *God*, as it seems there is *not* (and here 'tis not proved that there is) this whole discourse falls to the ground. And as to the *Idea* of *my self* (if I respect the *Body*) it proceeds from *Sight*, but (if the *Soul*) there

is

is no *Idea* of a *Soul*, but we collect by Ratiocination, that there is ſome inward thing in a Mans Body, that imparts to it *Animal Motion*, by which it *perceives* and *moves*, and this (whatever it be) without any *Idea* we call a *Soul*.

ANSWER.

If there be an *Idea* of *God* (as 'tis manifeſt that there is) this whole *Objection* falls to the ground; and then he ſubjoyns, *That we have no Idea of the Soul, but collect it by Ratiocination*, 'Tis the ſame as if he ſhould ſay, that there is no *Image* thereof repreſented in the *Phantaſie*, but yet, that there is ſuch a Thing, as I call an *Idea*.

OBJECT. VIII.

* *AN other Idea of the Sun as taken from the Arguments of Aſtronomers, that is conſequentially collected by me from certain natural notions.*

At the ſame time we can certainly have but one *Idea* of the Sun, whether it be look'd at by our eyes, or collected by *Ratiocination* to be much bigger than it

ſeems; for this laſt is not an *Idea* of the Sun, but a proof by Arguments, that the *Idea* of the *Sun* would be much larger, if it were look'd at nigher. But at different or ſeveral times the *Ideas* of the Sun may be diverſe, as if at one time we look at it with our bare eye, at an other time through a Teloſcope; but Aſtronomical arguments do not make the *Idea* of the Sun greater or leſs, but they rather tell us that the *ſenſible Idea* thereof is *falſe*.

ANSWER.

Here alſo (as before) what he ſays is not the *Idea* of the Sun, and yet is deſcribed, is that very thing which I call the *Idea*.

OBJECT. IX.

*FOr without doubt thoſe Ideas which Repreſent ſubſtances are ſomething more, or (as I may ſay) have more of objective Reality in them, then thoſe that repreſent only accidents or modes; and again, that by which I underſtand a mighty God, Eternal, Infinite, Omniſcient, Omnipotent, Creatour of all things beſides himſelf, has certainly

certainly in it more objective reality, then those by which Finite ſubſtances are exhibited.

I have before often noted that there can be no *Idea* of *God* or the *Mind*: I will now ſuperadd, That neither can there be an *Idea* of *Subſtance*. For *Subſtance* (Which is only *Matter Subject* to *Accidents* and *Changes*) is *Collected* only by *Reaſoning*, but it is not at all *Conceived*, neither does it *repreſent* to us any *Idea*. And if this be true, How can it be ſaid, *That thoſe Ideas which repreſent to us Subſtances have in them ſomething More, or More Objective Reality, then thoſe which repreſents to us Accidents?* Beſides, Let *Des-Cartes* again Conſider what he means by **More Reality**? Can *Reality* be increas'd or diminiſh'd? Or does he think that One *Thing* can be *More A Thing* then an other *Thing*? let him Conſider how this can be Explain'd to our Underſtandings with that *Perſpicuity* or Clearneſs which is requiſite in all *Demonſtrations*, and Which He Himſelf is uſed to preſent us with upon other Occaſions.

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ANSWER.

I have often noted before, That that very Thing which is *evidenc'd* by *Reaſon*, as alſo whatever elſe is perceived by any other Means, is Called by Me an *Idea*. And I have ſufficiently explain'd How *Reality* may be *Encreas'd* or *Diminiſh'd*, in the ſame manner (to wit) as *Subſtance* is *More a Thing*, then A *Mode*; and if there be any ſuch things as *Real Qualities*, or *Incomplete Subſtances*, theſe are *More Things* then *Modes*, and *Leſs Things* then *Complete Subſtances*: and Laſtly if there be an *Infinite Independent Subſtance* this is More a *Thing*, then a *Finite, Dependent Subſtance*. And all this is ſelf-evident.

OBJECT. X.

**Wherefore There only Remains the Idea of God; Wherein I muſt conſider whether there be not ſomething Included, which cannot Poſſibly have its Original from me. By the Word, God, I mean a certain Infinite Subſtance, Independent, Omniſcient, Almighty, by whom both I my ſelf and every thing Elſe That Is (if any thing*

thing do actually exiſt) was Created; All which attributes are of ſuch an High Nature That the more attentively I conſider them, the Leſs I Conceive my ſelf alone poſſible to be the Author of theſe notions; from what therefore has been ſaid I muſt Conclude there is a God.

Conſidering the *Attributes* of *God*, that from thence we may gather an *Idea* of *God*, and that we may enquire whether there be not ſomething in that *Idea* which cannot Poſſibly Proceed from our ſelves, I diſcover (if I am not Deceived) that what we think off at the *Venerable name* of *God* proceeds neither from our ſelves, neither is it Neceſſary that they ſhould have any other *Orignal* then from *Outward Objects*. For by the Name of *God* I underſtand a **Subſtance**, that is, I underſtand that *God* Exiſts (not by an *Idea*, but by Reaſoning) **Infinite** (that is, I cannot conceive or Imagine Terms or Parts in him ſo Extream, but I can Imagine others Farther) from whence it follows, that not an *Idea* of *Gods Infinity* but of my Own bounds and Limits preſents it ſelf at the Word *Infinite*. **Independent**, That is, I do not conceive any *Cauſe* from

from which *God* may proceed; from whence 'tis evident that I have no other *Idea* at the word *Independent*, but the memory of my own *Ideas* which at Different Times have *Different Beginnings*, and Conſequently they muſt be *Dependent*.

Wherefore, to ſay that God is *Independent*, is only to ſay That *God* is in the Number of thoſe things, the *Original* whereof I do not Imagine: and ſo to ſay that *God* is *Infinite*, is the ſame as if we ſay That He is in the Number of Thoſe Things whoſe *Bounds* we do not Conceive: And thus any *Idea* of *God* is Explo ded, for What *Idea* can we have without *Beginning* or *Ending*?

Omniſcient or Underſtanding all things, Here *I* deſire to know, by what *Idea*, *Des-Cartes* underſtands *Gods Underſtanding*? **Almighty**. I deſire alſo to know by What *Idea Gods Power* is *underſtood*? For *Power* is in Reſpect of Future Things, that is, Things not Exiſting. For my Part, I underſtand *Power* from the Image or Memory of paſt Actions, arguing with my ſelf thus, He did ſo, therefore he was *able* (or had *Power*) to do ſo, therefore (continuing the ſame) he will again have *Power* to do ſo. But now

all

all theſe are *Ideas* that may ariſe from *external Objects*.

Creatour of all things, *I* can frame an *Image* of *Creation* from what I ſee every day, as a Man Born, or growing from a Punctum to that ſhape and ſize he now bears; an other *Idea* then this no man can have at the word *Creatour*; But the *Poſſibility* of *Imagining* a Creation is not ſufficient to prove that the world *was created*. And therefore tho it were *Demonſtrated* that ſome *Infinite Independent Almighty Being* did *exiſt*, yet it will not from thence follow that a *Creatour exiſts*; unleſs one can think this to be a right inference, we *believe* that there exiſts ſomething that has created all other things, therefore the world *was Created* thereby.

Moreover when he ſays, that the *Idea* of *God*, and of our *Soul* is *Innate* or *born in us*, I would fain know, whether the *Souls* of thoſe that *ſleep ſoundly* do *think* unleſs they *dream*; If not, then at that time they have no *Ideas*, and conſequently no *Idea* is *Innate*, for what is *Innate* to us is never *Abſent* from us.

ANSWER.

ANSWER.

None of *Gods* Attributes can proceed from *outward objects* as from a *Pattern*, becauſe there is nothing found in God like what is found in *External*, that is, *Corporeal* things; Now tis manifeſt that whatever we think of in him *differing* or *unlike* what we find in them proceeds not from them, but from a cauſe of that very *diverſity* in our Thought.

And here I deſire to know, how this Philoſoper deduces *Gods Underſtanding* from *outward Things*, and yet I can eaſily explain what *Idea* I have thereof, by ſaying, that by the *Idea* of *Gods Underſtanding* I conceive whatever is the *Form* of any *Perception*; For who is there that does not perceive that he *underſtands* ſomething or other, and conſequently he muſt thereby have an *Idea* of *underſtanding*, and by enlarging it *Indefinitely* he forms the *Idea* of *Gods Underſtanding*. And ſo of his other Attributes.

And ſeeing we have made uſe of that *Idea* of *God* which is in us to demonſtrate his exiſtence, and ſeeing there is contain'd

tain'd in this *Idea* ſuch an *Immenſe Power*, that we conceive it a contradiction for *God* to *Exiſt*, and yet that any thing ſhould *Be* beſides Him, which was not *Created* by Him, it plainly follows that demonſtrating His exiſtence we demonſtrate alſo that the whole world, or all things different from *God*, were *Created* by God.

Laſtly when we aſſert, that ſome *Ideas* are *Innate* or *natural* to us, we do not mean that they are always preſent with us (for ſo no *Idea* would be *Innate*) but only that we have in our ſelves a Faculty of producing them.

OBJECT.

**THe whole ſtreſs of which Argument lyes thus; becauſe I know it impoſſible for me to be of the ſame nature I am, viz, having the Idea of a God in me, unleſs really there were a God, A God (I ſay) that very ſame God, whoſe Idea I have in my mind.*

Wherefore ſeeing tis not *demonſtrated* that we have an *Idea* of *God*, and the Chriſtian Religion commands us to believe

lieve that *God* is *Inconceivable*; that is, as I ſuppoſe, that we cannot have an *Idea* of Him, it follows, that the *Exiſtence* of *God* is not demonſtrated, much leſs *the Creation.*

ANSWER.

When *God* is ſaid to be *Inconceiveable* tis underſtood of an *Adequate full conception.* But I am 'een tired with often repeating, how notwithſtanding we may have an *Idea* of *God.* So that here is nothing brought that makes any thing againſt my *demonſtration.*

OBJECT. XII.

Againſt the Fourth Meditation, Of Truth and Falſhood.

**BY Which I underſtand that Error (as it is Error) is not a Real Being, Depenaent on God, but is only a Defect; and that therefore to make me Err there is not requiſite a Faculty of Erring Given me by God.*

'Tis Certain that *Ignorance* is only a *Defect*, and that there is no Occaſion of any

ny *Positive Faculty* to make us *Ignorant*. But this position is not so clear in Relation to *Error*, for Stones and Inanimate Creatures cannot *Err*, for this Reason only, because they have not the *Faculties* of *Reasoning* or *Imagination*; from whence 'tis Natural for us to Conclude, That to *Err* there is requisite a *Faculty* of *Judging*, or at least of *Imagining*, both which *Faculties* are *Positive*, and given to all *Creatures* subject to Error, and to Them only.

Moreover *Des-Cartes* says thus, *I find* (my Errors) *to Depend on two concurring Causes*, viz. *on my Faculty of Knowing, and on my Faculty of Choosing, or Freedom of my Will.* Which seems Contradictious to what he said before; And here also we may note, that *Freedom of Will* is assumed without any Proof contrary to the Opinion of the Calvinists.

ANSWER.

Tho to make us *Err* there is requisite a *Faculty* of *Reasoning* (or rather of *Judging*, that is, of *Affirming* and *Denying*) because *Error* is the *Defect* thereof, yet it doesnot follow from thence that this *De-*

ſelf is any thing *Real*, for neither is *Blindneſs* a *Real* Thing, tho ſtones cannot be ſaid to be *Blind*, for this Reaſon only, That they are *incapable of ſight*. And I much wonder that in all theſe *Objections* I have not found one *Right Inference*.

I have not here aſſumed any thing concerning the *Freedom* of *Mans Will*, unleſs what all Men do Experience in themſelves, and is moſt evident by the Light of Nature. Neither ſee I any Reaſon, Why he ſhould ſay that this is Contradictious to any former Poſition.

Perhaps there may be Many, who reſpecting *Gods prediſpoſal* of Things cannot Comprehend, How their *Freedom* of *Will* Conſiſts there-with, but yet there is no Man who, reſpecting himſelf only, does not find by Experience, That 'tis one and the ſame Thing to be *Willing*, and to be *Free*. But 'tis no Place to Enquire what the Opinion of others may be in this Matter.

OBJECT. XIII.

* *AS for Example, When lately I ſet my ſelf to examine Whether any Thing*

Thing Do Exiſt, and found, that from my ſetting my ſelf to examine ſuch a Thing, it evidently follows, That I my ſelf Exiſt, I could not but Judge, what I ſo clearly underſtood, to be true, not that I was forced thereto by any outward Impulſe, but becauſe a ſtrong Propenſion in my Will did follow this Great Light in my Underſtanding, ſo that I believed it ſo much the more Freely and Willingly, by how much the Leſs indifferent I was thereunto.

This expreſſion, *Great Light in the Underſtanding*, is *Metaphorical*, and therefore not to be uſed in Argumentation; And every one, that Doubts not of his Opinion, Pretends ſuch a *Light*, and has no leſs a *Propenſion* in his *Will* to Affirm what he doubts not, than He that *really* and *truely* knows a Thing. Wherefore this *Light* may be the cauſe of *Defending* and *Holding* an Opinion *Obſtinately*, but never of *knowing* an Opinion *Truly*.

Moreover not only the *Knowledge* of *Truth*, but *Belief* or *Giving Aſſent*, are not the *Acts* of the *Will*; for Whatever is *proved* by *ſtrong Arguments*, or *Credibly* told, we Believe whether we will or no.

'Tis True, To *Affirm* or *Deny* Propoſitions, to *Defend* or *Oppoſe* Propoſitions, are the *Acts* of the *Will*; but it does not from thence Follow that the *Internal Aſſent* depends on the *Will*. Wherefore the following Concluſion (*ſo that in the abuſe of our Freedom of Will that Privation conſiſts which Conſtitutes Error*) is not fully Demonſtrated.

ANSWER.

'Tis not much *matter*, Whether this expreſſion, *Great Light*, be *Argumentative* or not, ſo it be explicative, as really it is, For all men know, that by *light in the underſtanding* is meant *clearneſs* of *knowledge*, which every one has not, that *thinks* he has; and this hinders not but this *light* in the *Underſtanding* may be very different from an *obſtinate Opinion* taken up without *clear perception*.

But when 'tis here ſaid, *That we aſſent to things clearly perceived whether we will or no*, 'tis the ſame, as if it were ſaid, *that willing or nilling, we deſire Good clearly known*; whereas the word *Nilling*, finds no room in ſuch Expreſſions, for it implies, that we will and nill the ſame thing.

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OBJECT. XIV.

Against the Fifth Meditation. Of the Essence of material things.

AS when for Example, I imagine a Triangle, tho perhaps such a Figure exists no where out of my thoughts, nor ever will exist, yet the Nature thereof is determinate, and its Essence or Form is immutable and eternal, which is neither made by me nor depends on my mind, as appears from this, that many properties may be demonstrated of this Triangle.

If a Triangle be *no where*, I understand not how it can have *any Nature*, for what is *no where*, is not, and therefore has not a *Being*, or any *Nature*.

A Triangle in the *Mind* arises from a Triangle *seen*, or from one made up of what has been *seen*; but when once we have given the name of a *Triangle* to a thing (from which we think the *Idea* of a *Triangle* arises) tho the Triangle it self perish, yet the *name* continues; In the like manner, when we have once conceived in our thought, *That all the Angles of a*

Triangle are equal to two right ones, and when we have given this other name (viz. *Having its three Angles equal to two right ones*) to a Triangle, tho afterwards there were no ſuch thing in the World, yet the *Name* would ſtill continue, and this Propoſition, *A Triangle is a Figure having three Angles equal to two right Ones*, would be *eternally true*. But the Nature of a Triangle will not be eternal if all Triangles were deſtroy'd.

This Propoſition likewiſe, *A Man is an Animal*, will be *true* to *Eternity*, becauſe the Word *Animal* will eternally ſignifie what the Word *Man* ſignifies; but certainly if *Mankind* periſh, *Humane Nature* will be no longer.

From whence 'tis Manifeſt, That *Eſſence* as 'tis diſtinguiſh'd from *Exiſtence* is nothing more than the *Copulation* of *Names* by this word *Is*, and therefore *Eſſence* without *Exiſtence* is meerly a *Fiction* of our own; and as the *Image* of a *Man* in the *Mind* is to a *Man*, ſo it ſeems *Eſſence* is to *Exiſtence*. Or as this Propoſition *Socrates is a Man*, is to this, *Socrates Is, or Exiſts*, ſo is the *Eſſence* of *Socrates* to his Exiſtence. Now this Propoſition

poſition, *Socrates is a Man*, when *Socrates* does not exiſt, ſignifies only the Connection of the Names, and the word *Is* carries under it the *Image* of the *unity* of the thing, which is called by theſe *Two Names*.

ANSWER.

The Difference between *Eſſence* and *Exiſtence* is known to all Men. And what is here ſaid of *Eternal Names* inſtead of *Eternal Truth*, has been long ago ſufficiently rejected.

OBJECT. XV.

Againſt the Sixth Meditation. Of the Exiſtence of Material *Beings.*

* *And ſeeing God has given me no Faculty to know whether theſe Ideas proceed from Bodies or not, but rather a ſtrong inclination to believe, that theſe Ideas are ſent from Bodies, I ſee no reaſon, why God ſhould not be counted a Deceiver, if theſe Ideas came from any where, but from Corporeal Beings, and therefore we muſt conclude that Corporeal Beings exiſt.*

'Tis a received opinion, that Phyſicians who deceive their Patients for their Healths ſake, and Fathers, who deceive their Children for their Good, are guilty thereby of no Crimes, for the *fault* of *Deceit* does not conſiſt in the *falſity* of *Words*, but in the *Injury* done to the Perſon deceived.

Let *D. Cartes* therefore conſider whether this Propoſition, *God can upon no account deceive us*, Univerſally taken be *true*; For if it be not *true* ſo univerſally taken, that Concluſion, *Therefore Corporeal Beings exiſt*, will not follow.

ANSWER.

'Tis not requiſite for the eſtabliſhment of my Concluſion, *That we cannot be deceived on any account* (for I willingly granted, that we may be *often* deceived) but that we cannot be deceived, when that our *Error* argues that in *God* there is ſuch a *Will* to *Cheat* us as would be *contradictious* to his *Nature*. And here again we have a *wrong inference* in this *Objection*.

The

The Laſt Objection.

*For *now I plainly diſcover a great difference between them* (that is ſleep and waking) *for my Dreams are never conjoyn'd by my Memory, with the other Actions of my Life.*

I deſire to Know, whether it be certain, that a Man *dreaming*, that the *doubts* whether he *dream or not*, may not *Dream*, that he joyns his *Dream* to the *Ideas* of things paſt long ſince; if he may, than thoſe *Actions* of his paſt life, may be thought as *true* as if he were awake.

Moreover becauſe (as *D. Cartes* affirms) the *Certainty* and *truth* of all *knowledge* depends only on the *knowledge* of the *True God*, either an Atheiſt cannot from the *Memory* of his paſt life conclude that he is *awake*, or elſe tis poſſible for a man to know that he is *awake* without the *Knowledge* of the *True God.*

ANSWER.

A Man that *dreams* cannot *really* connect his *dreams* with the *Ideas* of paſt things, tho, I confeſs, he may *dream* that he

he ſo connects them; for whoever deny'd, That a man when he is *a ſleep* may be *Deceived*? But when he awakens he may eaſily diſcover his Error.

An Atheiſt from the memory of his paſt life may collect that he is awake, but he cannot know, that this *Sign* is ſufficient to make him *certain*, that he is not *deceived*, unleſs he know that he is *created* by a *God* that will not *deceive* him.

FINIS.

A Catalogue of ſome Books ſold by Benjamin Took *at the Ship in St.* Pauls *Church-yard.*

HErodoti Halicarnaſſæi Hiſtoriarum libri novem ejuſdem narratio de vita Homeri, Gr. Lat. & H. Stephani Apologia pro Herodoto acceſſerunt huic Edition Chronologia Hiſtoria, & Tabulæ Geographica Herodoteæ, necnon variantes Lectiones & notæ ex pluribus M. S. S. Cod. & Antiquis ſcriptoribus collectæ, fol.

Franciſci Suarez. Doct. Theol. Gran. Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legiſlatore in decem libros diſtributus. fol.

Thorndicius de Ratione ac Jure finiendi Controverſias Eccleſiæ. fol.

The Holy Court in five Tomes, written in French by *N. Cauſin*, tranſlated by Sir *T. H.* the fourth Edition. *fol.*

The Works of the moſt Reverend *John Bramhal*, D. D. late L. Archbiſhop of *Armagh*, ſome of which never before printed, with the life of the Author, *&c. fol.*

The Hiſtory and Vindication of the Iriſh Remonſtrance againſt all Calumnies and

Cen-

Cenſures in ſeveral Treatiſes. *folio.*

A Collection of all the Statutes now in uſe in the Kingdom of *Ireland*, with Notes in the Margin: And likewiſe the Acts of Settlement and Explanation, with the reſt of the Acts, made in the Reign of his Majeſty that now is, to the diſſolution of the Parliament, *Aug.* 1666.

Several Chyrurgical Treatiſes by *Rich. Wiſeman*, Serjeant Chyrurgion. *folio.*

The Primitive Origination of Mankind conſidered and examined, according to the light of Nature, written by Sir *M. Hale*, Kt. late Lord Chief Juſtice of the Kings Bench. *folio.*

Sir *Richs. Baker's* Chronicle of the Kings of *England* from the Romans Government to this time.

Thirty five Sermons by the Right Reverend *R. Sanderſon* late Lord Biſhop of *Lincoln.*

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full references to the moſt authentick Law Books, by Sir *Humphry Winch*, Kt. ſometimes one of the Juſtices of the Court of Common Pleas, *fol.*

Etymologicon Linguæ Anglicanæ; ſeu explicatio vocum Anglicarum Etymologica ex propriis fontibus. Omnia Alphabetico ordine in quinque diſtinctas Claſſes digeſta. Authore Step. Skinner, M. D. folio.

A large Dictionary in three Parts by *Tho. Holyoake* D. D. *folio.*

Horæ Hebraicæ & Talmudicæ impenſæ in Evangelium S. Johannis. p. I. Lightfoot. quarto.

Doctor *Browns* Travels in *Hungaria*, *Servia*, *Bulgaria*, *Macedonia*, &c. As alſo through a great part of *Germany*, with Obſervations on the Mines, Baths, and mineral Waters in thoſe Parts, illuſtrated with the Figures of ſome habits and remarkable places. *quarto.*

A Repreſentation of the State of Chriſtianity in *England*, and of its Decay and Danger from Sectaries as well as Papiſts.

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FINIS.